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Dennis Kucinich Prayer for America – Los Angeles, California on 2 February 2002

Transcript

I offer these brief remarks today as a prayer for our country, as a celebration of our country. With love of democracy. With love of our country. With hope for our country. With a belief that the light of freedom cannot be extinguished as long as it is inside of us. With a belief that freedom rings resoundingly in a democracy each time we speak freely. With the understanding that freedom stirs the human heart and fear stills it. With the belief that a free people cannot walk in fear and faith at the same time. With the understanding that there is a deeper truth in the unity of the United States. That implicit in the union of our country is the union of all people, everywhere. That all people are essentially one. That the world is interconnected not only on the material level of economics, trade, communication, and transportation; but interconnected through human consciousness, through the human heart, through the heart of the world, through the simply expressed impulse to be and to breathe free.

I offer this prayer for America.

Let us pray that our nation will remember that the unfolding of the promise of democracy in our nation paralleled the striving and accomplishment of civil rights. That is why we must challenge the rationale of the Patriot Act. We must ask why should America put aside guarantees of constitutional justice?

How can we justify in effect canceling the First Amendment and the right of free speech, and the right to peacefully assemble?

How can we justify, in effect, canceling the Fourth Amendment, probable cause, the prohibitions against unreasonable search and seizure?

How can we justify, in effect, canceling the Fifth Amendment, nullifying due process, allowing for indefinite incarceration without a trial?

How can we justify, in effect, canceling the Sixth Amendment, the right to prompt and public trial?

How can we justify, in effect, canceling the Eighth Amendment which protects against cruel and unusual punishment?

We cannot justify widespread wiretaps and internet surveillance without judicial supervision, let alone with it.

We cannot justify secret searches without a warrant.

We cannot justify giving the Attorney General the ability to designate domestic terror groups.

We cannot justify giving the FBI total access to any type of data which may exist in any system anywhere, including medical and financial records.

We cannot justify giving the CIA the ability to target people in this country for domestic intelligence and intelligence surveillance.

We cannot justify a government which takes from the people our right to privacy and then assumes for its own operations a right to total secrecy.

The Attorney General recently covered up a statue of Lady Justice showing her bosom as if to underscore there is no danger of justice exposing herself in this administration.

Let us pray, oremus, that our nation’s leaders will not be overcome by fear. Because today there is great fear in the Capitol. And this must be understood before we can ask about the shortcomings of Congress in this current environment.

The great fear began when we had to evacuate the Capitol on September 11. It continued when we had to leave the Capitol again when a bomb scare occurred as members were pressing the CIA during a secret briefing. It continued when we abandoned Washington during the anthrax scare, when anthrax, possibly from a government lab, arrived in the mail. It continued when the Attorney General declared a nationwide terror alert and then brought the destructive Patriot Bill to the floor of the House of Representatives. It continued in the release of the Bin Laden tapes at the very same time the president was announcing our country would withdraw from the ABM treaty.

It remains present in the cordoning off of the Capitol. It is present in the camouflaged armed national guardsmen who greet members of Congress each day we enter the Capitol campus. It is present in the labyrinth of concrete barriers through which we must pass each time we go to vote.

The trappings of a state of siege trap us in a state of fear, ill-equipped to deal with the Patriot Games, the Mind Games, the War Games of an unelected president and his undisclosed vice president.

Let us pray. Let us pray that our country will stop this war. “To provide for the common defense” is one of the formational principles of America. Our Congress gave the President the ability to respond to the tragedy of September 11. We licensed a response to those who helped create the terror of September 11th. But we the people and our elected representatives must reserve the right to measure the response, to proportion the response, to challenge the response, and to correct the response.

Because we did not authorize the invasion of Iraq.

We did not authorize the invasion of Iran.

We did not authorize the invasion of North Korea.

We did not authorize the bombing of civilians in Afghanistan.

We did not authorize permanent detainees in Guantanamo Bay.

We did not authorize the withdrawal from the Geneva Convention.

We did not authorize military tribunals suspending due process and habeas corpus.

We did not authorize assassination squads.

We did not authorize the resurrection of COINTELPRO.

We did not authorize the repeal of the Bill of Rights.

We did not authorize the revocation of the Constitution.

We did not authorize national identity cards.

We did not authorize the eye of Big Brother to peer from cameras throughout our cities.

We did not authorize an eye for an eye.

Nor did we ask that the blood of innocent people, who perished on September 11, be avenged with the blood of innocent villagers in Afghanistan.

We did not authorize this administration to wage war anytime, anywhere, anyhow it pleases.

We did not authorize war without end.

We did not authorize a permanent war economy.

Yet we are upon the threshold of a permanent war economy. The president has requested a $45.6 billion increase in military spending. All defense-related programs will cost close to $400 billion.

Consider that the Department of Defense has never passed an independent audit.

Consider that the Inspector General notified Congress, recently, that the Pentagon cannot properly account for $1.2 trillion – that’s trillion – in expenditures. Correct, that it cannot account for $1.2 trillion in transactions. Consider that in recent years the Department of Defense could not match $22 billion worth of expenditures to the items it purchased. Consider that it has written off as lost billions of dollars worth of in-transit inventory and stored nearly $30 billion worth of spare parts it did not need.

Yet the Pentagon’s budget grows with more money for weapons systems to fight a cold war which ended, weapon systems in search of new enemies to create new wars. This has nothing to do with fighting terror. This has everything to do with fueling a military industrial machine with the treasure of our nation, risking the future of our nation, risking democracy itself with the militarization of thought which follows the militarization of the budget.

Let us pray for our children. Our children deserve a world without end. Not a war without end. Our children deserve a world free of the terror of hunger, free of the terror of poor health care, free of the terror of homelessness, free of the terror of ignorance, free of the terror of hopelessness, free of the terror of policies which are committed to a world view which is not appropriate for the survival of democratic values, not appropriate for the survival of a free people, not appropriate for the survival of a nation, not appropriate for the survival of the world.

Let us pray that we have the courage and the will as a people, and as a nation, to shore ourselves up, to reclaim from the ruins of September 11th our democratic traditions.

Let us declare. Let us declare our love of democracy. And declare our intent for peace.

Let us work to make nonviolence an organizing principle in our own society.

Let us recommit ourselves to the slow and painstaking work of statecraft, which sees peace, not war, as being inevitable.

Let us work for a world where someday war becomes archaic.

Let us work for a world where nuclear disarmament is an imperative. This is the vision which the proposal to create a Department of Peace envisions. Forty-three members of Congress are now cosponsoring the legislation.

Let us work for a world where America can lead the way in banning all nuclear weapons not only from our land and sea and sky but from outer space itself. This is the vision of HR 3616: A universe free of fear. Where we can look up at God’s creation in the stars and imagine infinite wisdom, infinite peace, infinite possibilities. Not infinite war, because we are taught that the kingdom will come on earth as it is in heaven.

Let us pray. Pray that we have the courage to replace the images of death which haunt us, the layers of images of September 11th, faded into images of patriotism, spliced into images of military mobilization, jump-cut into images of our secular celebrations of the World Series, New Year’s Eve, the Super Bowl, the Olympics, the strobic flashes which touch our deepest fears, let us replace those images with the images of people working to rebuild their democratic institutions. With images of the work of human relations. Of the work of reaching out to people, helping our citizens here at home. Of lifting the plight of people everywhere.

That is the America which has the ability to rally the support of the world.

That is the America which stands not in pursuit of an axis of evil, but which is itself the axis of hope and faith and peace and freedom.

America, America. God shed grace on thee. And crown thy good with brotherhood and sisterhood.

America, America. Long may Thy land be bright with Freedom’s holy light.

America, America. Let us pray for our country. Let us love our country. Let us defend our country not only from the threats without but from the threats within.

America, America. Crown thy good. Not with weapons of mass destruction. Not with invocations of an axis of evil. Not through breaking international treaties. Not through establishing America as king of a uni-polar world. But through looking at America as a nation among nations and viewing the world as an interconnected whole.

Crown thy good, America. Crown thy good with sisterhood and brotherhood. And crown thy good with compassion and restraint and forbearance and a commitment to peace and democracy here at home and in the world. And a commitment to economic democracy here at home and throughout the world.

Crown thy good, America. Crown thy good America. Crown thy good.

Thanks…

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Donald Rumsfeld Speech About Bureaucratic Waste

20131106we-donald-rumsfeld-speech-military-waste-10-september-2001-640x360

(Source: “DOD Acquisition and Logistics Excellence Week Kickoff—Bureaucracy to Battlefield,” Department of Defense, 10 September 2001, by Donald Rumsfeld. The posting date and location of transcripts is the same as the date for the event.)

DOD Acquisition and Logistics Excellence Week Kickoff—Bureaucracy to Battlefield

Remarks as Delivered by Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, The Pentagon , Monday, September 10, 2001

[Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics)] Pete Aldridge, Service Secretaries, distinguished officials of the Department of Defense.

[Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] General [Richard] Myers, thank you very much for those kind words.

The topic today is an adversary that poses a threat, a serious threat, to the security of the United States of America. This adversary is one of the world’s last bastions of central planning. It governs by dictating five-year plans. From a single capital, it attempts to impose its demands across time zones, continents, oceans and beyond. With brutal consistency, it stifles free thought and crushes new ideas. It disrupts the defense of the United States and places the lives of men and women in uniform at risk.

Perhaps this adversary sounds like the former Soviet Union, but that enemy is gone: our foes are more subtle and implacable today. You may think I’m describing one of the last decrepit dictators of the world. But their day, too, is almost past, and they cannot match the strength and size of this adversary.

The adversary’s closer to home. It’s the Pentagon bureaucracy. Not the people, but the processes. Not the civilians, but the systems. Not the men and women in uniform, but the uniformity of thought and action that we too often impose on them.

In this building, despite this era of scarce resources taxed by mounting threats, money disappears into duplicative duties and bloated bureaucracy—not because of greed, but gridlock. Innovation is stifled—not by ill intent but by institutional inertia.

Just as we must transform America’s military capability to meet changing threats, we must transform the way the Department works and what it works on. We must build a Department where each of the dedicated people here can apply their immense talents to defend America, where they have the resources, information and freedom to perform.

Our challenge is to transform not just the way we deter and defend, but the way we conduct our daily business. Let’s make no mistake: The modernization of the Department of Defense is a matter of some urgency. In fact, it could be said that it’s a matter of life and death, ultimately, every American’s.

A new idea ignored may be the next threat overlooked. A person employed in a redundant task is one who could be countering terrorism or nuclear proliferation. Every dollar squandered on waste is one denied to the warfighter. That’s why we’re here today challenging us all to wage an all-out campaign to shift Pentagon’s resources from bureaucracy to the battlefield, from tail to the tooth.

We know the adversary. We know the threat. And with the same firmness of purpose that any effort against a determined adversary demands, we must get at it and stay at it.

Some might ask, how in the world could the Secretary of Defense attack the Pentagon in front of its people? To them I reply, I have no desire to attack the Pentagon; I want to liberate it. We need to save it from itself.

The men and women of this department, civilian and military, are our allies, not our enemies. They too are fed up with bureaucracy, they too live with frustrations. I hear it every day. And I’ll bet a dollar to a dime that they too want to fix it. In fact, I bet they even know how to fix it, and if asked, will get about the task of fixing it. And I’m asking.

They know the taxpayers deserve better. Every dollar we spend was entrusted to us by a taxpayer who earned it by creating something of value with sweat and skill — a cashier in Chicago, a waitress in San Francisco. An average American family works an entire year to generate $6,000 in income taxes. Here we spill many times that amount every hour by duplication and by inattention.

That’s wrong. It’s wrong because national defense depends on public trust, and trust, in turn, hinges on respect for the hardworking people of America and the tax dollars they earn. We need to protect them and their efforts.

Waste drains resources from training and tanks, from infrastructure and intelligence, from helicopters and housing. Outdated systems crush ideas that could save a life. Redundant processes prevent us from adapting to evolving threats with the speed and agility that today’s world demands.

Above all, the shift from bureaucracy to the battlefield is a matter of national security. In this period of limited funds, we need every nickel, every good idea, every innovation, every effort to help modernize and transform the U.S. military.

We must change for a simple reason — the world has — and we have not yet changed sufficiently. The clearest and most important transformation is from a bipolar Cold War world where threats were visible and predictable, to one in which they arise from multiple sources, most of which are difficult to anticipate, and many of which are impossible even to know today.

Let there be no question: the 2.7 million people who wear our country’s uniform — active, Guard and Reserve — and the close to 700,000 more who support them in civilian attire, comprise the finest military in the history of the world. They stand ready to face down any threat, anytime, anywhere. But we must do more.

We must develop and build weapons to deter those new threats. We must rebuild our infrastructure, which is in a very serious state of disrepair. And we must assure that the noble cause of military service remains the high calling that will attract the very best.

All this costs money. It costs more than we have. It demands agility — more than today’s bureaucracy allows. And that means we must recognize another transformation: the revolution in management, technology and business practices. Successful modern businesses are leaner and less hierarchical than ever before. They reward innovation and they share information. They have to be nimble in the face of rapid change or they die. Business enterprises die if they fail to adapt, and the fact that they can fail and die is what provides the incentive to survive. But governments can’t die, so we need to find other incentives for bureaucracy to adapt and improve.

The technology revolution has transformed organizations across the private sector, but not ours, not fully, not yet. We are, as they say, tangled in our anchor chain. Our financial systems are decades old. According to some estimates, we cannot track $2.3 trillion in transactions. We cannot share information from floor to floor in this building because it’s stored on dozens of technological systems that are inaccessible or incompatible.

We maintain 20 to 25 percent more base infrastructure than we need to support our forces, at an annual waste to taxpayers of some $3 billion to $4 billion. Fully half of our resources go to infrastructure and overhead, and in addition to draining resources from warfighting, these costly and outdated systems, procedures and programs stifle innovation as well. A new idea must often survive the gauntlet of some 17 levels of bureaucracy to make it from a line officer’s to my desk. I have too much respect for a line officer to believe that we need 17 layers between us.

Our business processes and regulations seems to be engineered to prevent any mistake, and by so doing, they discourage any risk. But ours is a nation born of ideas and raised on improbability, and risk aversion is not America’s ethic, and more important, it must not be ours.

Those who fear danger do not volunteer to storm beaches and take hills, sail the seas, and conquer the skies. Now we must free you to take some of the same thoughtful, reasoned risks in the bureaucracy that the men and women in uniform do in battle.

To that end, we’re announcing today a series of steps the Department of Defense will take to shift our focus and our resources from bureaucracy to battlefield, from tail to tooth.

Today’s announcements are only the first of many. We will launch others ourselves, and we will ask Congress for legislative help as well. We have, for example, asked Congress for permission to begin the process of closing excess bases and consolidating the B-1 bomber force.

But we have the ability—and, therefore, the responsibility—to reduce waste and improve operational efficiency on our own. Already we have made some progress. We’ve eliminated some 31 of the 72 acquisition-related advisory boards. We now budget based on realistic estimates. We’re improving the acquisition process. We’re investing $400 million in public-private partnerships for military housing. Many utility services to military installations will be privatized.

We’re tightening the requirements for other government agencies to reimburse us for detailees, and we’re reviewing to see whether we should suspend assignments where detailees are not fully reimbursed.

We have committed $100 million for financial modernization, and we’re establishing a Defense Business Board to tap outside expertise as we move to improve the department’s business practices.

We can be proud of this progress but certainly not satisfied.

To succeed, this effort demands personal and sustained attention at the highest levels of the Department. Therefore, it will be guided by the Senior Executive Council including Under Secretary Pete Aldridge, Army Secretary Thomas White, Navy Secretary Gordon England, and Air Force Secretary Jim Roche. These leaders are experienced, talented, and determined. I am delighted they are on our team. I would not want to try to stop them from what they came into this Department to do. I expect them to be enormously successful, as they have in their other endeavors throughout their lives.

Because the Department must respond quickly to changing threats, we’re overhauling the 40-year-old Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System, or PPBS, the annual process of forecasting threats for the next several years, matching threats to programs and programs to budgets.

It’s really a relic of the Cold War, a holdover from the days when it was possible to forecast threats for the next several years because we knew who would be threatening us for the next several decades. It’s also a relic of the Cold War in another regard. PPBS is, I suppose, one of the last vestiges of central planning on Earth. We’ve combined the programming and budgeting phases to reduce duplicative work and speed decision-making. The streamlined process that should result will be quicker and cheaper and more flexible.

In order to make decisions more quickly, we must slash duplication and encourage cooperation. Currently the Departments of the Army, the Air Force and the Navy operate separate but parallel staffs for their civilian and uniformed chiefs. These staffs largely work the same issues and perform the same functions. Secretaries White and Roach will soon announce plans for realigning the Departments to support information sharing, speed decision-making, integrate Reserve and Guard headquarters into Department headquarters. Secretary England is engaging a broad agenda of change in the Department of Navy as well.

It’s time to start asking tough questions about redundant staffs. Let me give you an example. There are dozens of offices of general counsel scattered throughout the Department. Each service has one. Every agency does, too. So do the Joint Chiefs. We have so many general counsel offices that we actually have another general counsel’s office whose only job is to coordinate all those general counsels. [Laughter.] You think I’m kidding. [Laughs.] [Laughter.]

The same could be said of a variety of other functions, from public affairs to legislative affairs. Now, maybe we need many of them, but I have a strong suspicion that we need fewer than we have, and we’re going to take a good, hard look and find out.

Department headquarters are hardly the only scenes of redundant bureaucracy. Health care is another. Each service branch has its own surgeon general and medical operation. At the department level, four different agencies claim some degree of control over the delivery of military health care.

Consider this snapshot. One out of every five officers in the United States Navy is a physician. That’s not to single out the Navy or to suggest that too many doctors wear uniforms. The Navy and Marine Corps’ forward deployments generate unique medical needs. Rather, it’s to say that some of those needs, especially where they may involve general practice or specialties unrelated to combat, might be more efficiently delivered by the private sector. And all of them would likely be more efficiently delivered with fewer overlapping bureaucracies.

We’ve begun to consolidate health care delivery under our TriCare management activity. Over the next two years we will reform the procurement of care from the private sector. I’ve asked the military departments and Personnel and Readiness organization to complete a revamping of the military health system by fiscal year 2003.

DOD also has three exchange systems and a separate commissary system, all providing similar goods and services. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that consolidating them could save some $300 million. I’ve asked that we promptly explore the use of tools, like consolidation and contracting, to ensure our uniformed personnel and their families get the very best.

Congress has mandated that we reduce headquarter staffs by 15 percent by fiscal year 2003. I have ordered at least an overall 15 percent reduction from fiscal year 1999 levels in the numerous headquarter staffs overall throughout the department, from the Pentagon to the CINCs to every base headquarters building in the world. It’s not just the law, it’s a good idea, and we’re going to get it done. It’s the right thing to do.

To transform the Department, we must look outside this building as well. Consequently, the Senior Executive Council will scour the Department for functions that could be performed better and more cheaply through commercial outsourcing. Here, too, we must ask tough questions. Here are a few:

Why is DOD one of the last organizations around that still cuts its own checks? When an entire industry exists to run warehouses efficiently, why do we own and operate so many of our own? At bases around the world, why do we pick up our own garbage and mop our own floors, rather than contracting services out, as many businesses do? And surely we can outsource more computer systems support.

Maybe we need agencies for some of those functions. Indeed, I know we do. Perhaps a public-private partnership would make sense for others, and I don’t doubt at least a few could be outsized — outsourced altogether.

Like the private sector’s best-in-class companies, DOD should aim for excellence in functions that are either directly related to warfighting or must be performed by the Department. But in all other cases, we should seek suppliers who can provide these non-core activities efficiently and effectively. The Senior Executive Council will begin a review of the Defense Finance and Accounting Service, the Defense Logistics Agency and Defense Information Service Agency.

Harnessing the expertise of the private sector is about something more, however. The Department of Defense was once an engine of technological innovation. Today the private sector is leading the way in many respects, yet DOD makes it harder and harder for us to keep up and for those who do keep up to do business with the Department. Consider that it takes today twice as long as it did in 1975 to produce a new weapon system, at a time when new generations of technology are churned out every 18 to 24 months.

That virtually guarantees that weapon systems are at least a generation old technologically the day they’re deployed. Meanwhile, our process and regulations have become so burdensome that many businesses have simply chosen not to do business with the Department of Defense.

To transform the Department, we must take advantage of the private sector’s expertise. I’ve asked the members of the Senior Executive Council to streamline the acquisition process and spur innovation in our traditional supplier base.

Finally, and perhaps most important, we must forge a new compact with war-fighters and those who support them, one that honors their service and understands their needs and encourages them to make national defense a life-long career.

Many of the skills we most require are also in high demand in the private sector, as all of you know. To compete, we need to bring the Department of Defense the human resources practices that have already transformed the private sector. Our compact with war fighters will address quality of life issues—like improvements in health care and housing—where we will make more use of public-private partnerships, and by working to reduce the amount of time they must spend away from their families on deployment.

No business I have known could survive under the policies we apply to our uniformed personnel. We encourage, and often force, servicemen and -women and retire after 20 years in service, after we’ve spent millions of dollars to train them and when, still in their 40s, they were at the peak of their talents and skills. Because our objective is to produce generalists, officers are most often rotated out of assignments every 12 to 24 months, giving them a flavor of all things but too often making them experts at none. Both policies exact a toll in institutional memory, in skill and in combat readiness. To that end, we intend to submit revised personnel legislation to the Congress at the beginning of fiscal year 2003.

If a shortcoming on the uniformed side is moving personnel too much, on the civilian end we map hardly any career path at all. There, too, we must employ the tools of modern business — more flexible compensation packages, modern recruiting techniques and better training.

Let me conclude with this note. Some may ask, defensively so, will this war on bureaucracy succeed where others have failed? To that I offer three replies. First is the acknowledgement, indeed this caution: Change is hard. It’s hard for some to bear, and it’s hard for all of us to achieve.

There’s a myth, sort of a legend, that money enters this building and disappears, like a bright light into a black hole, never to be seen again. In truth, there is a real person at the other end of every dollar, a real person who’s in charge of every domain, and that means that there will be real consequences from, and real resistance to, fundamental change. We will not complete this work in one year, or five years, or even eight years. An institution built with trillions of dollars over decades of time does not turn on a dime. Some say it’s like turning a battleship. I suspect it’s more difficult.

That’s the disadvantage of size. But here’s the upside. In an institution this large, a little bit of change goes a very long way. If we can save just 5 percent of one year’s budget, and I have never seen an organization that couldn’t save 5 percent of its budget, we would free up some $15 billion to $18 billion, to be transferred from bureaucracy to the battlefield, from tail to tooth. Even if Congress provides us every nickel of our fiscal year ’02 budget, we will still need these extra savings to put towards transformation in this Department.

Second, this effort is structurally different from any that preceded it, I suspect. It begins with the personal endorsement, in fact the mandate, of the President of the United States. President Bush recently released a management agenda that says that performance, not promises, will count. He is personally engaged and aware of the effort that all of you are engaged in. The battle against a stifling bureaucracy is also a personal priority for me and for the Service Secretaries, one that will, through the Senior Executive Council, receive the sustained attention at the highest levels of this Department. We have brought people on board who have driven similar change in the private sector. We intend to do so here. We will report publicly on our progress. The old adage that you get what you inspect, not what you expect, or put differently, that what you measure improves, is true. It is powerful, and we will be measuring.

Our strongest allies are the people of this department, and to them I say we need your creativity, we need your energy. If you have ideas or observations for shifting the department’s resources from tail to tooth, we welcome them. In fact, we’ve set up a dedicated e- mail address: http://www.tailtotooth@osd.pentagon.mil where anyone can send in any thoughts they have.

Finally, this effort will succeed because it must. We really have no choice. It is not, in the end, about business practices, nor is the goal to improve figures on the bottom line. It’s really about the security of the United States of America. And let there be no mistake, it is a matter of life and death. Our job is defending America, and if we cannot change the way we do business, then we cannot do our job well, and we must. So today we declare war on bureaucracy, not people, but processes, a campaign to shift Pentagon resources from the tail to the tooth. All hands will be required, and it will take the best of all of us.

Now, like you, I’ve read that there are those who will oppose our every effort to save taxpayers’ money and to strengthen the tooth-to- tail ratio. Well, fine, if there’s to be a struggle, so be it. But keep in mind the story about the donkey, the burro, and the ass. The man and the boy were walking down the street with the donkey and people looked and laughed at them and said, “Isn’t that foolish—they have a donkey and no one rides it.” So the man said to the boy, “Get on the donkey; we don’t want those people to think we’re foolish.” So they went down the road and people looked at the boy on the donkey and the man walking alongside — “Isn’t that terrible, that young boy is riding the donkey and the man’s walking.” So they changed places, went down the road, people looked and said, “Isn’t that terrible, that strong man is up there on the donkey and making the little boy walk.” So they both got up on the donkey, the donkey became exhausted, came to a bridge, fell in the river and drowned. And of course the moral of the story is, if you try to please everybody, you’re going to lose your donkey. [Laughter.]

So as we all remember that if you do something, somebody’s not going to like it, so be it. Our assignment is not to try to please everybody. This is not just about money. It’s not about waste. It’s about our responsibility to the men and women in uniform who put their lives at risk. We owe them the best training and the best equipment, and we need the resources to provide that. It’s about respect for taxpayers’ dollars. A cab driver in New York City ought to be able to feel confident that we care about those dollars.

It’s about professionalism, and it’s also about our respect for ourselves, about how we feel about seeing GAO reports describing waste and mismanagement and money down a rat hole.

We need your help. I ask for your help. I thank all of you who are already helping. I have confidence that we can do it. It’s going to be hard. There will be rough times. But it’s also the best part of life to be engaged in doing something worthwhile.

Every person within earshot wants to be a part of a proud organization, an organization that cares about excellence in everything it does. I know it. You know it. Let’s get about it.

Thank you very much. [Applause.]

The Iraq Incursion You Never Heard About

6 weeks prior to the beginning of the Iraq war, an operative ran an incursion into Iraq, without any weapons, and extracted 15 hostages. Here’s how he did it.

Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan

(Source: “Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,” Wikipedia, 5 November 2013. The post date for this article is 7 January 1935. It was argued on 10-11 December 1934.)

Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan293 U.S. 388 (1935), also known as the Hot Oil case, was a case in which the United States Supreme Court ruled unconstitutional the Roosevelt Administration’s prohibition of interstate and foreign trade in petroleumgoods produced in excess of state quotas—the “hot oil” orders adopted under the 1933 National Industrial Recovery Act.

The ruling was the first of several which overturned key elements of the Administration’s New Deal legislative program. The relevant section 9(c) of the NIRA was found to be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power in that it permitted Presidential interdiction of trade without defining criteria for the application of the proposed restriction.

The finding thus differed from later Court rulings which argued that Federal government action affecting intrastate production breached the Commerce Clause of the Constitution: in Panama v. Ryan the Court found that Congress had violated thenondelegation doctrine by vesting the President with legislative powers without clear guidelines, giving the President enormous and unchecked powers. The omission of Congressional guidance on State petroleum production ceilings occasioned the adverse ruling because this omission allowed the executive to assume the role of the legislature. JusticeCardozo dissented, claiming that the guidelines had been sufficient.

Expanded Reading from FindLaw.com

PANAMA REFINING CO. v. RYAN, 293 U.S. 388 (1935)

293 U.S. 388

PANAMA REFINING CO. et al.
v.
RYAN et al.

AMAZON PETROLEUM CORPORATION et al.
v.
SAME.

Nos. 135, 260.
Argued Dec. 10, 11, 1934.
Decided Jan. 7, 1935.

[293 U.S. 388, 391]   Messrs. J. N. Saye, of Longview, Tex., and F. W. Fischer, of Tyler, Tex., for petitioners.

[293 U.S. 388, 398]   Mr. Harold M. Stephens, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondents.

[293 U.S. 388, 405]  

Mr. Chief Justice HUGHES delivered the opinion of the Court.

On July 11, 1933, the President, by Executive Order No. 6199 (15 USCA 709 note), prohibited ‘the transportation in interstate and foreign commerce of petroleum and the products thereof produced or withdrawn from storage in excess of the amount permitted to be produced or withdrawn from storage by any State law or valid regulation or order prescribed thereunder, by any board, commission, officer, or other duly[293 U.S. 388, 406]   authorized agency of a State.’ This action was based on section 9(c) of title 1 of the National Industrial Recovery Act of June 16, 1933, 48 Stat. 195, 200, 15 U.S.C. tit. 1, 709(c), 15 USCA 709(c). That section provides:

    ‘Sec. 9. …
    ‘(c) The President is authorized to prohibit the transportation in interstate and foreign commerce of petroleum and the products thereof produced or withdrawn from storage in excess of the amount permitted to be produced or withdrawn from storage by any State law or valid regulation or order prescribed thereunder, by any board, commission, officer, or other duly authorized agency of a State. Any violation of any order of the President issued under the provisions of this subsection shall be punishable by fine of not to exceed $1,000, or imprisonment for not to exceed six months, or both.’

On July 14, 1933, the President, by Executive Order No. 6204 (15 USCA 709 note), authorized the Secretary of the Interior to exercise all the powers vested in the President ‘for the purpose of en- [293 U.S. 388, 407]  forcing Section 9(c) of said act and said order’ of July 11, 1933, ‘including full authority to designate and appoint such agents and to set up such boards and agencies as he may see fit, and to promulgate such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary.’ That order was made under section 10(a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act, 48 Stat. 200, 15 U.S.C. 710(a), 15 USCA 710(a), authorizing the President ‘to prescribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes’ of title 1 of the National Industrial Recovery Act and providing that ‘any violation of any such rule or regulation shall be punishable by fine of not to exceed $500, or imprisonment for not to exceed six months, or both.’

On July 15, 1933, the Secretary of the Interior issued regulations to carry out the President’s orders of July 11 and 14, 1933. These regulations were amended by orders [293 U.S. 388, 408]   of July 25, 1933, and August 21, 1933, prior to the commencement of these suits. Regulation IV provided, in substance, that every producer of petroleum should file a monthly statement under oath, beginning August 15, 1933, with the Division of Investigations of the Department of the Interior giving information with respect to the residence and post office address of the producer, the location of his producing properties and wells, the allowable production as prescribed by state authority, the amount of daily production, all deliveries of petroleum, and declaring that no part of the petroleum or products produced and shipped had been produced or withdrawn from storage in excess of the amount permitted by state authority. Regulation V required every purchaser, shipper (other than a producer), and refiner of petroleum, including processors, similarly to file a monthly statement under oath, giving information as to residence and post office address, the place and date of receipt, the parties from whom and the amount of petroleum received and the amount held in storage, the disposition of the petroleum, particulars as to deliveries, and declaring, to the best of the affiant’s information and belief, that none of the petroleum so handled had been produced or withdrawn from storage in excess of that allowed by state authority. Regulation VII provided that all persons embraced within the terms of section 9(c) of the act, 15 USCA 709(a) and the executive orders and regulations issued thereunder, should keep ‘available for inspection by the Division of Investigations of the Department of the Interior adequate books and records of all transactions involving the production and transportation of petroleum and the products thereof.’

On August 19, 1933, the President, by Executive Order No. 6256, stating that his action was taken under title 1 of the National Industrial Recovery Act, approved a ‘Code of [293 U.S. 388, 409]   Fair Competition for the Petroleum Industry.’ By a further Executive Order of August 28, 1933, the President designated the Secretary of the Interior as Administrator, and the Department of the Interior as the federal agency, to exercise on behalf of the President all the powers vested in him under that act and code. Section 3(f) of title 1 of the National Industrial Recovery Act, 15 USCA 703(f), provides that, when a code of fair competition has been approved or prescribed by the President under that title, ‘any violation of any provision thereof in any transaction in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce shall [293 U.S. 388, 410]   be a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof an offender shall be fined not more than $500 for each offense, and each day such violation continues shall be deemed a separate offense.’

This ‘Petroleum Code’ (in its original form and as officially printed) provided in section 3 of article III relating to ‘Production’ for estimates of ‘required production of crude oil to balance consumer demand for petroleum products’ to be made at intervals by the federal agency. This ‘required production’ was to be ‘equitably allocated’ among the several states. These estimates and allocations, when approved by the President, were to be deemed to be ‘the net reasonable market demand,’ and the allocations were to be recommended ‘as the operating schedules for the producing States and for the industry.’ By section 4 of article III, the subdivision, with respect to producing properties, of the production allocated to each state, was to be made within the state. The second paragraph of that section further provided:

    ‘If any subdivision into quotas of production allocated to any State shall be made within a State any production by any person, as person is defined in Article I, Section 3 of this code in excess of any such quota assigned to him, shall be deemed an unfair trade practice and in violation of this code.’

By an Executive Order of September 13, 1933, No. 6284-a, modifying certain provisions of the Petroleum Code, this second paragraph of section 4 of article III was eliminated. It was reinstated by Executive Order of September 25, 1934, No. 6855

These suits were brought in October, 1933.

In No. 135, the Panama Refining Company, as owner of an oil refining plant in Texas, and its coplaintiff, a producer having oil and gas leases in Texas, sued to restrain the defendants, who were federal officials, from enforcing Regulations IV, V, and VII prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior under section 9(c) of the National Industrial [293 U.S. 388, 411]   Recovery Act. Plaintiffs attacked the validity of section 9(c) as an unconstitutional delegation to the President of legislative power and as transcending the authority of the Congress under the commerce clause. The regulations, and the attempts to enforce them by coming upon the properties of the plaintiffs, gauging their tanks, digging up pipe lines, and otherwise, were also assailed under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the Constitution.

In No. 260, the Amazon Petroleum Corporation and its coplaintiffs, all being oil producers in Texas and owning separate properties, sued to enjoin the Railroad Commission of that state, its members and other state officers, and the other defendants who were federal officials, from enforcing the state and federal restrictions upon the production and disposition of oil. The bill alleged that the legislation of the state and the orders of its commission in curtailing production violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. As to the federal requirements, the bill not only attacked section 9(c) of the National Industrial Recovery Act, and the regulations of the Secretary of the Interior thereunder, upon substantially the same grounds as those set forth in the bill of the Panama Refining Company, but also challenged the validity of provisions of the Petroleum Code. While a number of these provisions were set out in the bill, the contest on the trial related to the limitation of production through the allocation of quotas pursuant to section 4 of article III of the code.

As the case involved the constitutional validity of orders of the state commission and an interlocutory injunction was sought, a court of three judges was convened under section 266 of the Judicial Code (28 U.S.C . 380 (28 USCA 380)). That court decided that the cause of action against the federal officials was not one within section 266, but was for the consideration of the District Judge alone. The parties agreed that the causes of action should be severed and that each cause [293 U.S. 388, 412]   should be submitted to the tribunal having jurisdiction of it. Hearing was had both on the applications for interlocutory injunction and upon the merits. The court of three judges, sustaining the state orders, denied injunction, and dismissed the bill as against the state authorities. Amazon Petroleum Corp. v. Railroad Comm. (D.C.) 5 F.Supp. 633, 634, 639.

In both cases against the federal officials, that of the Panama Refining Company and that of the Amazon Petroleum Corporation, heard by the District Judge, a permanent injunction was granted. 5 F.Supp. 639. In the case of the Amazon Petroleum Corporation, the court specifically enjoined the defendants from enforcing section 4 of article III of the Petroleum Code; both plaintiffs and defendants and the court being unaware of the amendment of September 13, 1933.

The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decrees against the federal officials and directed that the bills be dismissed. Ryan v. Amazon Petroleum Corp., 71 F.(2d) 1; Ryan v. Panama Refining Co., 71 F.(2d) 8. The cases come here on writs of certiorari granted on October 8, 1934, 293 U.S. 539 , 55 S.Ct. 102, 79 L.Ed. –; 293 U.S. 539 , 55 S.Ct. 83, 79 L.Ed. –.

First. The controversy with respect to the provision of section 4 of article III of the Petroleum Code was initiated and proceeded in the courts below upon a false assumption. That assumption was that this section still contained the paragraph (eliminated by the Executive Order of September 13, 1933) by which production in excess of assigned quotas was made an unfair practice and a violation of the code. Whatever the cause of the failure to give appropriate public notice of the change in the section, with the result that the persons affected, the prosecuting authorities, and the courts, were alike ignorant of the alteration, the fact is that the attack in this respect was upon a provision which did not exist. The government’s announcement that, by reason of the elimination of this paragraph, the government ‘cannot, and therefore it does not intend to, prosecute petitioners or other producers of oil in Texas, criminally or otherwise, [293 U.S. 388, 413]   for exceeding, at any time prior to September 25, 1934, the quotas of production assigned to them under the laws of Texas,’ but that, if ‘petitioners, or other producers, produce in excess of such quotas after September 25, 1934, the government intends to prosecute them,’ cannot avail to import into the present case the amended provision of that date. The case is not one where a subsequent law is applicable to a pending suit and controls its disposition. When this suit was brought and when it was heard, there was no cause of action for the injunction sought with respect to the provision of section 4 of article III of the code; as to that, there was no basis for real controversy. See California v. San Pablo & T.R. Co., 149 U.S. 308, 314 , 13 S.Ct. 876; United States v. Alaska Steamship Co., 253 U.S. 113, 116 , 40 S.Ct. 448; Barker Painting Co. v. Local No. 734, Brotherhood of Painters, etc., 281 U.S. 462 , 50 S.Ct. 356. If the government undertakes to enforce the new provision, the petitioners, as well as others, will have an opportunity to present their grievance, which can then be considered, as it should be, in the light of the facts as they will then appear.

For this reason, we pass to the other questions presented, and we express no opinion as to the interpretation or validity of the provisions of the Petroleum Code.

Second. Regulations IV, V, and VII, issued by the Secretary of the Interior prior to these suits, have since been amended. But the amended regulations continue sub- [293 U.S. 388, 414]   stantially the earlier requirements and expand them. They present the same constitutional questions, and the cases as to these are not moot. Southern Pacific Company v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 219 U.S. 433, 452 , 31 S. Ct. 288; Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 219 U.S. 498 , 514-516, 31 S.Ct. 279; McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 181 , 182 S., 47 S.Ct. 319, 50 A.L.R. 1.

The original regulations of July 15, 1933, as amended July 25, 1933, and August 21, 1933, were issued to enforce the Executive Orders of July 11 and July 14, 1933. The Executive Order of July 11, 1933, was made under section 9(c) of the National Industrial Recovery Act, and the Executive Order of July 14, 1933, under section 10(a) of that act, authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to promulgate regulations, was for the purpose of enforcing section 9(c) and the Executive Order of July 11, 1933. The amended regulations have been issued for the same purpose. The fundamental question as to these regulations thus turns upon the validity of section 9( c) and the executive orders to carry it out.

Third. The statute provides that any violation of any order of the President issued under section 9(c) shall be punishable by fine of not to exceed $1,000, or imprisonment for not to exceed six months, or both. We think that these penalties would attach to each violation, and in this view the plaintiffs were entitled to invoke the equitable jurisdiction to restrain enforcement, if the statute and the executive orders were found to be invalid. Philadelphia Company v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605, 620 , 621 S., 32 S.Ct. 340; Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 214-216, 44 S. Ct. 15; Hygrade Provision Company v. Sherman, 266 U.S. 497, 499 , 500 S., 45 S.Ct. 141.

Fourth. Section 9[c] is assailed upon the ground that it is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. The section purports to authorize the President to pass a prohibitory law. The subject to which this authority relates is defined. It is the transportation in interstate and [293 U.S. 388, 415]   foreign commerce of petroleum and petroleum products which are produced or withdrawn from storage in excess of the amount permitted by state authority. Assuming for the present purpose, without deciding, that the Congress has power to interdict the transportation of that excess in interstate and foreign commerce, the question whether that transportation shall be prohibited by law is obviously one of legislative policy. Accordingly, we look to the statute to see whether the Congress has declared a policy with respect to that subject; whether the Congress has set up a standard for the President’s action; whether the Congress has required any finding by the President in the exercise of the authority to enact the prohibition.

Section 9(c) is brief and unambiguous. It does not attempt to control the production of petroleum and petroleum products within a state. It does not seek to lay down rules for the guidance of state Legislatures or state officers. It leaves to the states and to their constituted authorities the determination of what production shall be permitted. It does not qualify the President’s authority by reference to the basis or extent of the state’s limitation of production. Section 9(c) does not state whether or in what circumstances or under what conditions the President is to prohibit the transportation of the amount of petroleum or petroleum products produced in excess of the state’s permission. It establishes no creterion to govern the President’s course. It does not require any finding by the President as a condition of his action. The Congress in section 9(c) thus declares no policy as to the transportation of the excess production. So far as this section is concerned, it gives to the President an unlimited authority to determine the policy and to lay down the prohibition, or not to lay it down, as he may see fit. And disobedience to his order is made a crime punishable by fine and imprisonment.[293 U.S. 388, 416]   We examine the context to ascertain if it furnishes a declaration of policy or a standard of action, which can be deemed to relate to the subject of section 9(c) and thus to imply what is not there expressed. It is important to note that section 9 (15 USCA 709) is headed ‘Oil Regulation’-that is, section 9 is the part of the National Industrial Recovery Act which particularly deals with that subject-matter. But the other provisions of section 9 afford no ground for implying a limitation of the broad grant of authority in section 9(c). Thus section 9(a) authorizes the President to initiate before the Interstate Commerce Commission ‘proceedings necessary to prescribe regulations to control the operations of oil pipe lines and to fix reasonable, compensatory rates for the transportation of petroleum and its products by pipe lines,’ and the Interstate Commerce Commission is to grant preference ‘to the hearings and determination of such cases.’ Section 9(b) authorizes the President to institute proceedings ‘to divorce from any holding company any pipe-line company controlled by such holding company which pipeline company by unfair practices or by exorbitant rates in the transportation of petroleum or its products tends to create a monopoly.’ It will be observed that each of these provisions contains restrictive clauses as to their respective subjects. Neither relates to the subject of section 9(c).

We turn to the other provisions of title 1 of the act. The first section (15 USCA 701) is a ‘declaration of policy.’ 6It declares that a national emergency exists which is ‘pro- [293 U.S. 388, 417]   ductive of widespread unemployment and disorganization of industry, which burdens interstate and foreign commerce, affects the public welfare, and undermines the standards of living of the American people.’ It is declared to be the policy of Congress ‘to remove obstructions to the free flow of interstate and foreign commerce which tend to diminish the amount thereof;’ ‘to provide for the general welfare by promoting the organization of industry for the purpose of cooperative action among trade groups;’ ‘to induce and maintain united action of labor and management under adequate governmental sanctions and supervision;’ ‘to eliminate unfair competitive practices, to promote the fullest possible utilization of the present productive capacity of industries, to avoid undue restriction of production (except as may be temporarily required), to increase the consumption of industrial and agricultural products by increasing purchasing power, to reduce and relieve unemployment, to improve standards of labor, and otherwise to rehabilitate industry and to conserve natural resources.’

This general outline of policy contains nothing as to the circumstances or conditions in which transportation of petroleum or petroleum products should be prohibited-nothing as to the policy of prohibiting or not prohibiting the transportation of production exceeding what the [293 U.S. 388, 418]   states allow. The general policy declared is ‘to remove obstructions to the free flow of interstate and foreign commerce.’ As to production, the section lays down no policy of limitation. It favors the fullest possible utilization of the present productive capacity of industries. It speaks, parenthetically, of a possible temporary restriction of production, but of what, or in what circumstances, it gives no suggestion. The section also speaks in general terms of the conservation of natural resources, but it prescribes no policy for the achievement of that end. It is manifest that this broad outline is simply an introduction of the act, leaving the legislative policy as to particular subjects to be declared and defined, if at all, by the subsequent sections.

It is no answer to insist that deleterious consequences follow the transportation of ‘hot oil’-oil exceeding state allowances. The Congress did not prohibit that transportation. The Congress did not undertake to say that the transportation of ‘hot oil’ was injurious. The Congress did not say that transportation of that oil was ‘unfair competition.’ The Congress did not declare in what circumstances that transportation should be forbidden, or require the President to make any determination as to any facts or circumstances. Among the numerous and diverse objectives broadly stated, the President was not required to choose. The President was not required to ascertain and proclaim the conditions prevailing in the industry which made the prohibition necessary. The Congress left the matter to the President without standard or rule, to be dealt with as he pleased. The effort by ingenious and diligent construction to supply a criterion still permits such a breadth of authorized action as essentially to commit to the President the functions of a Legislature rather than those of an executive or administrative [293 U.S. 388, 419]   officer executing a declared legislative policy. We find nothing in section 1 which limits or controls the authority conferred by section 9(c).

We pass to the other sections of the act. Section 2 (15 USCA 702) relates to administrative agencies which may be constituted. Section 3 (15 USCA 703) provides for the approval by the President of ‘codes’ for trades or industries. These are to be codes of ‘fair competition’ and the authority is based upon certain express conditions which require findings by the President. Action under section 9(c) is not made to depend on the formulation of a code under section 3. In fact, the President’s action under section 9(c) was taken more than a month before a Petroleum Code was approved. Subdivision (e) of section 3 (15 USCA 703(e) authorizes the President, on his own motion or upon complaint, as stated, in case any article is being imported into the United States ‘in substantial quantities or increasing ratio to domestic production of any competitive article,’ under such conditions as to endanger the maintenance of a code or agreement under title 1, to cause an immediate investigation by the Tariff Commission. The authority of the President to act, after such investigation, is conditioned upon a finding by him of the existence of the underlying facts, and he may permit entry of the articles concerned upon such conditions and with such limitations as he shall find it necessary to prescribe in order that the entry shall not tend to render the code or agreement ineffective. Section 4 (15 USCA 704) relates to agreements and licenses for the purposes stated. Section 5 (15 USCA 705) refers to the application of the anti-trust laws. Sections 6 and 7 (15 USCA 706, 707) impose limitations upon the application of title 1, bearing upon trade associations and other organizations and upon the relations between employers and employees. Section 8 (15 USCA 708), contains provisions with respect to the application of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of May 12, 1933 (7 USCA 601 et seq.). [293 U.S. 388, 420]   None of these provisions can be deemed to prescribe any limitation of the grant of authority in section 9(c).

Fifth. The question whether such a delegation of legislative power is permitted by the Constitution is not answered by the argument that it should be assumed that the President has acted, and will act, for what he believes to be the public good. The point is not one of motives, but of constitutional authority, for which the best of motives is not a substitute. While the present controversy relates to a delegation to the President, the basic question has a much wider application. If the Congress can make a grant of legislative authority of the sort attempted by section 9(c), we find nothing in the Constitution which restricts the Congress to the selection of the President as grantee. The Congress may vest the power in the officer of its choice or in a board or commission such as it may select or create for the purpose. Nor, with respect to such a delegation, is the question concerned merely with the transportation of oil, or of oil produced in excess of what the state may allow. If legislative power may thus be vested in the President or other grantee as to that excess of production, we see no reason to doubt that it may similarly be vested with respect to the transportation of oil without reference to the state’s requirements. That reference simply defines the subject of the prohibition which the President is authorized to enact or not to enact as he pleases. And, if that legislative power may be given to the President or other grantee, it would seem to follow that such power may similarly be conferred with respect to the transportation of other commodities in interstate commerce with or without reference to state action, thus giving to the grantee of the power the determination of what is a wise policy as to that transportation, and authority to permit or prohibit it, as the person or board or commission so chosen may [293 U.S. 388, 421]  think desirable. In that view, there would appear to be no ground for denying a similar prerogative of delegation with respect to other subjects of legislation.

The Constitution provides that ‘All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.’ Article 1, 1. And the Congress is empowered ‘To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution’ its general powers. Article 1, 8, par. 18. The Congress manifestly is not permitted to abdicate or to transfer to others the essential legislative functions with which it is thus vested. Undoubtedly legislation must often be adapted to complex conditions involving a host of details with which the national Legislature cannot deal directly. The Constitution has never been regarded as denying to the Congress the necessary resources of flexibility and practicality, which will enable it to perform its function in laying down policies and establishing standards, while leaving to selected instrumentalities the making of subordinate rules within prescribed limits and the determination of facts to which the policy as declared by the Legislature is to apply. Without capacity to give authorizations of that sort we should have the anomaly of a legislative power which in many circumstances calling for its exertion would be but a futility. But the constant recognition of the necessity and validity of such provisions and the wide range of administrative authority which has been developed by means of them cannot be allowed to obscure the limitations of the authority to delegate, if our constitutional system is to be maintained.

The Court has had frequent occasion to refer to these limitations and to review the course of congressional action. At the very outset, amid the disturbances due to war in Europe, when the national safety was imperiled[293 U.S. 388, 422]   and our neutrality was disregarded, the Congress passed a series of acts, as a part of which the President was authorized, in stated circumstances, to lay and revoke embargoes, to give permits for the exportation of arms and military stores, to remit and discontinue the restraints and prohibitions imposed by acts suspending commercial intercourse with certain countries, and to permit or interdict the entrance into waters of the United States of armed vessels belonging to foreign nations. These early acts were not the subject of judicial decision, and, apart from that, they afford no adequate basis for a conclusion that the Congress assumed that it possessed an unqualified power of delegation. They were inspired by the vexations of American commerce through the hostile enterprises of the belligerent powers,8 they were directed to the effective execution of policies repeatedly declared by the Congress, and they confided to the President, for the purposes and under the conditions stated, an authority which was cognate to the conduct by him of the foreign relations of the government.   [293 U.S. 388, 423]   The first case relating to an authorization of this description was that of The Aurora v. United States, 7 Cranch, 382, 388. The cargo of that vessel had been condemned as having been imported from Great Britain in violation of the Nonintercourse Act of March 1, 1809 (2 Stat. 528). That act expired on May 1, 1810,10 when Congress passed another [293 U.S. 388, 424]   act (2 Stat. 605, 606) providing that, in case either Great Britain or France before March 3, 1811, ‘shall … so revoke or modify her edicts as that they shall cease to violate the neutral commerce of the United States, which fact the President of the United States shall declare by proclamation, and if the other nation shall not within three months thereafter so revoke or modify her edicts in like manner’ (section 4), then, with respect to that nation, as stated, the provisions of the act of 1809, after three months from that proclamation, ‘shall … be revived and have full force and effect.’ On November 2, 1810, the President issued his proclamation declaring that France had so revoked or modified her edicts, and it was contended that the provisions of the act of 1809, as to the cargo in question, had thus been revived. The Court said that it could see no sufficient reason why the Legislature should not exercise its discretion in reviving the act of 1809, ‘either expressly or conditionally, as their judgment should direct.’ The provision of that act declaring ‘that it should continue in force to a certain time, and no longer,’ could not restrict the power of the Legislature to extend its operation ‘without limitation upon the occurrence of any subsequent combination of events.’ This was a decision, said the Court in Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 683 , 12 S.Ct. 495, 501, ‘that it was competent for congress to make the revival of an act depend upon the proclamation of the president, showing the ascertainment by him of the fact that the edicts of certain nations had been so revoked or modified that they did not violate the neutral commerce of the United States.’

In Field v. Clark, supra, the Court applied that ruling to the case of ‘the suspension of an act upon a contingency to be ascertained by the president, and made known by his proclamation.’ The Court was dealing with section 3 of the Act of October 1, 1890, 26 Stat. 567, 612. [293 U.S. 388, 425]   That section provided that, ‘with a view to secure reciprocal trade’ with countries producing certain articles, ‘whenever, and so often as the President shall be satisfied’ that the government of any country producing them imposed ‘duties or other exactions upon the agricultural or other products of the United States’ which, in view of the free list established by the act, the President ‘may deem to be reciprocally unequal and unreasonable, he shall have the power and it shall be his duty,’ to suspend the free introduction of those articles by proclamation to that effect, and that during that suspension the duties specified by the section should be levied. The validity of the provision was challenged as a delegation to the President of legislative power. The Court reviewed the early acts to which we have referred, as well as later statutes considered to be analogous. 11 While sustaining the provision, the Court emphatically declared that the principle that ‘congress cannot delegate legislative power to the president’ is ‘universally [293 U.S. 388, 426]   recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the constitution.’ The Court found that the act before it was not inconsistent with that principle; that it did not ‘in any real sense, invest the president with the power of legislation.’ As ‘the suspension was absolutely required when the president ascertained the existence of a particular fact,’ it could not be said ‘that in ascertaining that fact, and in issuing his proclamation, in obedience to the legislative will, he exercised the function of making laws.’ ‘He was the mere agent of the law-making department to ascertain and declare the event upon which its expressed will was to take effect.’ Id., pages 692, 693 of 143 U.S., 12 S.Ct. 495, 504, 505. The Court referred with approval to the distinction pointed out by the Supreme Court of Ohio in Cincinnati, Wilmington, etc., Railroad v. Clinton County Commissioners, 1 Ohio St. 88, between ‘the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.’

Applying that principle, authorizations given by Congress to selected instrumentalities for the purpose of ascertaining the existence of facts to which legislation is directed have constantly been sustained. Moreover the Congress may not only give such authorizations to determine specific facts, but may establish primary standards, devolving upon others the duty to carry out the declared legislative policy; that is, as Chief Justice Marshall expressed it, ‘to fill up the details’ under the general provisions made by the Legislature. Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 43. In Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 496 , 24 S.Ct. 349, 352, the Act of March 2, 1897 (29 Stat. 604, 605, 3 (see 21 USCA 43)), was upheld, which authorized the Secretary of the Treasury, upon the recommendation of a board of experts, to ‘establish uniform standards of purity, quality, and fitness[293 U.S. 388, 427]   for consumption of all kinds of teas imported into the United States.’ The Court construed the statute as expressing ‘the purpose to exclude the lowest grades of tea, whether demonstrably of inferior purity, or unfit for consumption, or presumably so because of their inferior quality.’ The Congress, the Court said, thus fixed ‘a primary standard’ and committed to the Secretary of the Treasury ‘the mere executive duty to effectuate the legislative policy declared in the statute.’ ‘Congress legislated on the subject as far as was reasonably practicable, and from the necessities of the case was compelled to leave to executive officials the duty of bringing about the result pointed out by the statute.’ See Red ‘C’ Oil Co. v. Board of Agriculture of North Carolina, 222 U.S. 380, 394 , 32 S.Ct. 152.

Another notable illustration is that of the authority given to the Secretary of War to determine whether bridges and other structures constitute unreasonable obstructions to navigation and to remove such obstructions. Act of March 3, 1899, 18, 30 Stat. 1153, 1154 (33 USCA 502). By that statute the Congress declared ‘a general rule and imposed upon the Secretary of War the duty of ascertaining what particular cases came within the rule’ as thus laid down. Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364, 386 , 27 S.Ct. 367; Monongahela Bridge Co. v. United States, 216 U.S. 177, 193 , 30 S.Ct. 356; Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605, 638 , 32 S.Ct. 340. Upon this principle rests the authority of the Interstate Commerce Commission, in the execution of the declared policy of the Congress in enforcing reasonable rates, in preventing undue preferences and unjust discriminations, in requiring suitable facilities for transportation in interstate commerce, and in exercising other powers held to have been validly conferred. St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Taylor, 210 U.S. 281, 287 , 28 S.Ct. 616; Inter-Mountain Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 476, 486 , 34 S.Ct. 986; Avent v. United States, 266 U.S. 127, 130 , 45 S.Ct. 34; New York Central Securities Corporation [293 U.S. 388, 428]   v. United States, 287 U.S. 12, 24 , 25 S., 53 S.Ct. 45. Upon a similar ground the authority given to the President, in appropriate relation to his functions as Commander-in-Chief, by the Trading with the Enemy Act, as amended by the Act of March 28, 1918 (40 Stat. 460, 12 (50 USCA Appendix 12)), with respect to the disposition of enemy property, was sustained. ‘The determination,’ said the Court, ‘of the terms of sales of enemy properties in the light of facts and conditions from time to time arising in the progress of war was not the making of a law; it was the application of the general rule laid down by the act.’ United States v. Chemical Foundation, 272 U.S. 1, 12 , 47 S.Ct. 1, 5.12

The provisions of the Radio Act of 1927 (44 Stat. 1162, 1163), providing for assignments of frequencies or wave lengths to various stations, afford another instance. In granting licenses, the Radio Commission is required to act ‘as public convenience, interest, or necessity requires.’ Section 4. In construing this provision, the Court found that the statute itself declared the policy as to ‘equality of radio broadcasting service, both of transmission and of reception,’ and that it conferred authority to make allocations and assignments in order to secure, according to stated criteria, an equitable adjustment in the distribution of facilities. 13 The standard set up was not so indefinite ‘as to confer an unlimited power.’ Federal Radio Commission v. Nelson Brothers Co.,289 U.S. 266, 279 , 285 S., 53 S.Ct. 627, 634.

So also, from the beginning of the government, the Congress has conferred upon executive officers the power to make regulations-‘not for the government of their departments, but for administering the laws which did govern.’ United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 517 , 31 S.Ct. 480, 483. Such regulations become, indeed, binding rules of con- [293 U.S. 388, 429]   duct, but they are valid only as subordinate rules and when found to be within the framework of the policy which the Legislature has sufficiently defined. In the case of Grimaud, supra, a regulation made by the Secretary of Agriculture requiring permits for grazing sheep on a forest reserve of lands belonging to the United States was involved. The Court referred to the various acts for the establishment and management of forest reservations and the authorization of rules which would ‘insure the objects of such reservations,’ that is, ‘to regulate their occupancy and use, and to preserve the forests thereon from destruction.’ The Court observed that ‘it was impracticable for Congress to provide general regulations for these various and varying details of management,’ and that, in authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture to meet local conditions, Congress ‘was merely conferring administrative functions upon an agent, and not delegating to him legislative power.’ Id., pages 515, 516 of 220 U. S., 31 S.Ct. 480, 482. The Court quoted with approval the statement of the principle in Field v. Clark, supra, that the Congress cannot delegate legislative power, and upheld the regulation in question as an administrative rule for the appropriate execution of the policy laid down in the statute. See Wayman v. Southard, supra; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U.S. 194, 214 , 215 S., 32 S.Ct. 436; Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 389 , 38 S.Ct. 159, L.R.A. 1918C, 361, Ann.Cas. 1918B, 856; McKinley v. United States, 249 U.S. 397 , 39 S.Ct. 324.

The applicable considerations were reviewed in Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 , 48 S.Ct. 348, 352, where the Court dealt with the so-called ‘flexible tariff provision’ of the Act of September 21, 1922 (42 Stat. 858, 941, 942, 315 (19 USCA 154-159)), and with the authority which it conferred upon the President. The Court applied the same principle that permitted the Congress to exercise its ratemaking power in interstate commerce, and found that a similar provision was justified for the fixing of customs duties; that is, as the Court said: ‘If Congress shall lay down by [293 U.S. 388, 430]   legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to fix such rates is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power. If it is thought wise to vary the customs duties according to changing conditions of production at home and abroad, it may authorize the Chief Executive to carry out this purpose, with the advisory assistance of a Tariff Commission appointed under congressional authority.’ The Court sustained the provision upon the authority of Field v. Clark, supra, repeating with approval what was there said, that ‘What the President was required to do was merely in execution of the act of Congress.’ Id., pages 409-411 of 276 U.S., 48 S.Ct. 348, 352.

Thus, in every case in which the question has been raised, the Court has recognized that there are limits of delegation which there is no constitutional authority to transcend. We think that section 9(c) goes beyond those limits. As to the transportation of oil production in excess of state permission, the Congress has declared no policy, has established no standard, has laid down no rule. There is no requirement, no definition of circumstances and conditions in which the transportation is to be allowed or prohibited.

If section 9(c) were held valid, it would be idle to pretend that anything would be left of limitations upon the power of the Congress to delegate its lawmaking function. The reasoning of the many decisions we have reviewed would be made vacuous and their distinctions nugatory. Instead of performing its lawmaking function, the Congress could at will and as to such subjects as it chooses transfer that function to the President or other officer or to an administrative body. The question is not of the intrinsic importance of the particular statute before us, but of the constitutional processes of legislation which are an essential part of our system of government. [293 U.S. 388, 431]   Sixth. There is another objection to the validity of the prohibition laid down by the executive order under section 9(c). The executive order contains no finding, no statement of the grounds of the President’s action in enacting the prohibition. Both section 9(c) and the executive order are in notable contrast with historic practice (as shown by many statutes and proclamations we have cited in the margin14) by which declarations of policy are made by the Congress and delegations are within the framework of that policy and have relation to facts and conditions to be found and stated by the President in the appropriate exercise of the delegated authority. If it could be said that from the four corners of the statute any possible inference could be drawn of particular circumstances or conditions which were to govern the exercise of the authority conferred, the President could not act validly without having regard to those circumstances and conditions. And findings by him as to the existence of the required basis of his action would be necessary to sustain that action, for otherwise the case would still be one of an unfettered discretion as the qualification of authority would be ineffectual. The point is pertinent in relation to the first section of the National Industrial Recovery Act. We have said that the first section is but a general introduction, that it declares no policy and defines no standard with respect to the transportation which is the subject of section 9(c). But if from the extremely broad description contained in that section and the widely different matters to which the section refers, it were possible to derive a statement of prerequisites to the President’s action under section 9(c), it would still be necessary for the President to comply with those conditions and to show that compliance as the ground of his prohibition. To hold [293 U.S. 388, 432]   that he is free to select as he chooses from the many and various objects generally described in the first section, and then to act without making any finding with respect to any object that he does select, and the circumstances properly related to that object, would be in effect to make the conditions inoperative and to invest him with an uncontrolled legislative power.

We are not dealing with action which, appropriately belonging to the executive province, is not the subject of judicial review or with the presumptions attaching to executive action. 15 To repeat, we are concerned with the question of the delegation of legislative power. If the citizen is to be punished for the crime of violating a legislative order of an executive officer, or of a board or commission, due process of law requires that it shall appear that the order is within the authority of the officer, board, or commission, and, if that authority depends on determinations of fact, those determinations must be shown. As the Court said in Wichita Railroad & Light Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 260 U.S. 48, 59 , 43 S.Ct. 51, 55: ‘In creating such an administrative agency, the Legislature, to prevent its being a pure delegation of legislative power, must enjoin upon it a certain course of procedure and certain rules of decision in the performance of its function. It is a wholesome and necessary principle that such an agency must pursue the procedure and rules enjoined, and show a substantial compliance therewith to give validity to its action. When, therefore, such an administrative agency is required as a condition precedent to an order, to make a finding of facts, the validity of the order must rest upon the needed finding. If it is lacking, the order is ineffective. [293 U.S. 388, 433]   It is pressed on us that the lack of an express finding may be supplied by implication and by reference to the averments of the petition invoking the action of the Commission. We cannot agree to this.’ Referring to the ruling in the Wichita Case, the Court said in Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 44 , 44 S.Ct. 283, 288: ‘We held that the order in that case, made after a hearing and ordering a reduction, was void for lack of the express finding in the order. We put this conclusion, not only on the language of the statute, but also on general principles of constitutional government.’ We cannot regard the President as immune from the application of these constitutional principles. When the President is invested with legislative authority as the delegate of Congress in carrying out a declared policy, he necessarily acts under the constitutional restriction applicable to such a delegation.

We see no escape from the conclusion that the Executive Orders of July 11, 1933, and July 14, 1933, Nos. 6199, 6204 (15 USCA 709 note), and the regulations issued by the Secretary of the Interior thereunder, are without constitutional authority.

The decrees of the Circuit Court of Appeals are reversed, and the causes are remanded to the District Court, with direction to modify its decrees in conformity with this opinion so as to grant permanent injunctions, restraining the defendants from enforcing those orders and regulations.

It is so ordered.

Mr. Justice CARDOZO (dissenting).

With all that is said in the opinion of the court as to the Code of Fair Competition adopted by the President August 16, 1933, for the Governance of the Petroleum Industry, I am fully in accord. No question is before us at this time as to the power of Congress to regulate production. No question is here as to its competence to clothe the President with a delegated power whereby a code of fair competition may become invested with the force of[293 U.S. 388, 434]   law. The petitioners were never in jeopardy by force of such a code or of regulations made thereunder. They were not in jeopardy because there was neither statute nor regulation subjecting them to pains or penalties if they set the code at naught. One must deplore the administrative methods that brought about uncertainty for a time as to the terms of executive orders intended to be law. Even so, the petitioners do not stand in need of an injunction to restrain the enforcement of a non-existent mandate.

I am unable to assent to the conclusion that section 9(c) of the National Recovery Act, 15 USCA 709(c), a section delegating to the President a very different power from any that is involved in the regulation of production or in the promulgation of a code, is to be nullified upon the ground that his discretion is too broad or for any other reason. My point of difference with the majority of the court is narrow. I concede that to uphold the delegation there is need to discover in the terms of the act a standard reasonably clear whereby discretion must be governed. I deny that such a standard is lacking in respect of the prohibitions permitted by this section when the act with all its reasonable implications is considered as a whole. What the standard is becomes the pivotal inquiry.

As to the nature of the act which the President is authorized to perform there is no need for implication. That at least is definite beyond the possibility of challenge. He may prohibit the transportation in interstate and foreign commerce of petroleum and the products thereof produced or withdrawn from storage in excess of the amount permitted by any state law or valid regulation or order prescribed thereunder. He is not left to roam at will among all the possible subjects of interstate transportation, picking and choosing as he pleases. I am far from asserting now that delegation would be [293 U.S. 388, 435]   valid if accompanied by all that latitude of choice. In the laying of his interdict he is to confine himself to a particular commodity, and to that commodity when produced or withdrawn from storage in contravention of the policy and statutes of the states. He has choice, though within limits, as to the occasion, but none whatever as to the means. The means have been prescribed by Congress. There has been no grant to the Executive of any roving commission to inquire into evils and then, upon discovering them, do anything he pleases. His act being thus defined, what else must he ascertain in order to regulate his discretion and bring the power into play? The answer is not given if we look to section 9(c) only, but it comes to us by implication from a view of other sections where the standards are defined. The prevailing opinion concedes that a standard will be as effective if imported into section 9(c) by reasonable implication as if put there in so many words. If we look to the whole structure of the statute, the test is plainly this, that the President is to forbid the transportation of the oil when he believes, in the light of the conditions of the industry as disclosed from time to time, that the prohibition will tend to effectuate the declared policies of the act-not merely his own conception of its policies, undirected by any extrinsic guide, but the policies announced by section 1 (15 USCA 701) in the forefront of the statute as an index to the meaning of everything that follows.   [293 U.S. 388, 436]   Oil produced or transported in excess of a statutory quota is known in the industry as ‘hot oil,’ and the record is replete with evidence as to the effect of such production and transportation upon the economic situation and upon national recovery. A declared policy of Congress in the adoption of the act is ‘to eliminate unfair competitive practices.’ Beyond question an unfair competitive practice exists when ‘hot oil’ is transported in interstate commerce with the result that lawabiding dealers must compete with lawbreakers. Here is one of the standards set up in the act to guide the President’s discretion. Another declared policy of Congress is ‘to conserve natural resources.’ Beyond question the disregard of statutory quotas is wasting the oil fields in Texas and other states and putting in jeopardy of exhaustion one of the treasures of the nation. All this is developed in the record and in the arguments of counsel for the government with a wealth of illustration. Here is a second standard. Another declared policy of Congress is to ‘promote the fullest possible utilization of the present productive capacity of industries,’ and ‘except as may be temporarily required’ to ‘avoid undue restriction of production.’ Beyond question prevailing conditions in the oil industry have brought about the need for temporary restriction in order to promote in the long run the fullest productive capacity of business in all its many [293 U.S. 388, 437]   branches, for the effect of present practices is to diminish that capacity by demoralizing prices and thus increasing unemployment. The ascertainment of these facts at any time or place was a task too intricate and special to be performed by Congress itself through a general enactment in advance of the event. All that Congress could safely do was to declare the act to be done and the policies to be promoted, leaving to the delegate of its power the ascertainment of the shifting facts that would determine the relation between the doing of the act and the attainment of the stated ends. That is what it did. It said to the President, in substance: You are to consider whether the transportation of oil in excess of the statutory quotas is offensive to one or more of the policies enumerated in section 1, whether the effect of such conduct is to promote unfair competition or to waste the natural resources or to demoralize prices or to increase unemployment or to reduce the purchasing power of the workers of the nation. If these standards or some of them have been flouted with the result of a substantial obstruction to industrial recovery, you may then by a prohibitory order eradicate the mischief.

I am not unmindful of the argument that the President has the privilege of choice between one standard and another, acting or failing to act according to an estimate of values that is individual and personal. To describe his conduct thus is to ignore the essence of his function. What he does is to inquire into the industrial facts as they exist from time to time. Cf. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 , at page 409, 48 S.Ct. 348; Locke’s Appeal, 72 Pa. 491, 498, 13 Am.Rep. 716, quoted with approval in Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 , at page 694, 12 S.Ct. 495. These being ascertained, he is not to prefer one standard to another in any subjective attitude of mind, in any personal or willful way. He is to study the facts objectively, the violation of a standard[293 U.S. 388, 438]   impelling him to action or inaction according to its observed effect upon industrial recovery-the ultimate end, as appears by the very heading of the title, to which all the other ends are tributary and mediate. Nor is there any essential conflict among the standards inter se, at all events when they are viewed in relation to section 9 (c) and the power there conferred. In its immediacy, the exclusion of oil from the channels of transportation is a restriction of interstate commerce, not a removal of obstructions. This is self-evident, and, of course, was understood by Congress when the discretionary power of exclusion was given to its delegate. But what is restriction in its immediacy may in its ultimate and larger consequences be expansion and development. Congress was aware that for the recovery of national well-being there might be need of temporary restriction upon production in one industry or another. It said so in section 1. When it clothed the President with power to impose such a restriction-to prohibit the flow of oil illegally produced-it laid upon him a mandate to inquire and determine whether the conditions in that particular industry were such at any given time as to make restriction helpful to the declared objectives of the act and to the ultimate attainment of industrial recovery. If such a situation does not present an instance of lawful delegation in a typical and classic form (Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 , 12 S.Ct. 495; United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 , 31 S.Ct. 480; Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 , 48 S.Ct. 348), categories long established will have to be formulated anew.

In what has been written, I have stated, but without developing the argument, that by reasonable implication the power conferred upon the President by section 9(c) is to be read as if coupled with the words that he shall exercise the power whenever satisfied that by doing so he will effectuate the policy of the statute as theretofore declared. Two canons of interpretation, each familiar to our law, [293 U.S. 388, 439]   leave no escape from that conclusion. One is that the meaning of a statute is to be looked for, not in any single section, but in all the parts together and in their relation to the end in view. Cherokee Intermarriage Cases (Red Bird v. U.S.), 203 U.S. 76, 89 , 27 S.Ct. 29; McKee v. United States, 164 U.S. 287 , 17 S.Ct. 92; Talbott v. Board of Com’rs of Silver Bow County, 139 U.S. 438, 443 , 444 S., 11 S.Ct. 594. The other is that, when a statute is reasonably susceptible of two interpretations, by one of which it is unconstitutional and by the other valid, the court prefers the meaning that preserves to the meaning that destroys. United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 407 , 29 S.Ct. 527; Knights Templars’ & Masons’ Life Indemnity Co. v. Jarman, 187 U.S. 197, 205 , 23 S.Ct. 108. Plainly, section 1, with its declaration of the will of Congress, is the chart that has been furnished to the President to enable him to shape his course among the reefs and shallows of this act. If there could be doubt as to this when section 1 (15 USCA 701) is viewed alone, the doubt would be dispelled by the reiteration of the policy in the sections that come later. In section 2 (15 USCA 702). which relates to administrative agencies, in section 3 (15 USCA 703), which relates to codes of fair competition, in section 4 (15 USCA 704), which relates to agreements and licenses, in section 6 (15 USCA 706), which prescribes limitations upon the application of the statute, and in section 10 (15 USCA 710), which permits the adoption of rules and regulations, authority is conferred upon the President to do one or more acts as the delegate of Congress when he is satisfied that thereby he will aid ‘in effectuating the policy of this title’ or in carrying out its provisions. True section 9 (15 USCA 709), the one relating to petroleum, does not by express words of reference embody the same standard, yet nothing different can have been meant. What, indeed, is the alternative? Either the statute means that the President is to adhere to the declared policy of Congress, or it means that he is to exercise a merely arbitrary will. The one construction invigorates the act; the other saps its life. A choice between them is not hard. [293 U.S. 388, 440]   I am persuaded that a reference, express or implied, to the policy of Congress as declared in section 1, is a sufficient definition of a standard to make the statute valid. Discretion is not unconfined and vagrant. It is canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 , 12 S.Ct. 495, United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 , 31 S.Ct. 480, and Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 , 48 S.Ct. 348, state the applicable principle. Under these decisions the separation of powers between the Executive and Congress is not a doctrinaire concept to be made use of with pedantic rigor. There must be sensible approximation, there must be elasticity of adjustment, in response to the practical necessities of government, which cannot foresee to-day the developments of tomorrow in their nearly infinite variety. The Interstate Commerce Commission, probing the economic situation of the railroads of the country, consolidating them into systems, shaping in numberless ways their capacities and duties, and even making or unmaking the prosperity of great communities (Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 289 U.S. 627 , 53 S.Ct. 768 ), is a conspicuous illustration. See, e.g., 41 Stat. 479-482, c. 91, 405, 406, 407, 408, 42 Stat. 27, c. 20, 49 U.S.C. 3, 4, 5 (49 USCA 3- 5). Cf. Inter-Mountain Rate Case (U.S. v. Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co.), 234 U.S. 476 , 34 S.Ct. 986; N.Y. Central Securities Co. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12, 24 , 25 S., 53 S.Ct. 45; Sharfman, The Interstate Commerce Commission, vol. 2, pp. 357, 365. There could surely be no question as to the validity of an act whereby carriers would be prohibited from transporting oil produced in contravention of a statute if in the judgment of the Commission the practice was demoralizing the market and bringing disorder and insecurity into the national economy. What may be delegated to a commission may be delegated to the President. ‘Congress may feel itself unable conveniently to determine exactly when its exercise of the legislative power should become effective, because dependent on future conditions, and it may leave [293 U.S. 388, 441]  the determination of such time to the decision of an executive.’ Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, supra, at page 407 of 276 U.S., 48 S.Ct. 348, 351. Only recently (1932) the whole subject was discussed with much enlightenment in the Report by the Committee on Ministers’ Powers to the Lord Chancellor of Great Britain. See, especially, pages 23, 51. In the complex life of to-day, the business of government could not go on without the delegation, in greater or less degree, of the power to adapt the rule to the swiftly moving facts.

A striking illustration of this need is found in the very industry affected by this section, the production of petroleum and its transportation between the states. At the passage of the National Recovery Act (48 Stat. 195) no one could be certain how many of the states would adopt valid quota laws, or how generally the laws would be observed when adopted, or to what extent illegal practices would affect honest competitors or the stability of prices or the conservation of natural resources or the return of industrial prosperity. Much would depend upon conditions as they shaped themselves thereafter. Violations of the state laws might turn out to be so infrequent that the honest competitor would suffer little, if any, damage. The demand for oil might be so reduced that there would be no serious risk of waste, depleting or imperiling the resources of the nation. Apart from these possibilities, the business might become stabilized through voluntary co-operation or the adoption of a code or otherwise. Congress not unnaturally was unwilling to attach to the state laws a sanction so extreme as the cutting off of the privilege of interstate commerce unless the need for such action had unmistakably developed. What was left to the President was to ascertain the conditions prevailing in the industry, and prohibit or fail to prohibit according to the effect of those conditions upon the phases of the national policy relevant thereto.[293 U.S. 388, 442]   From a host of precedents available, both legislative and judicial, I cite a few as illustrations. By an act approved June 4, 1794, during the administration of Washington (1 Stat. 372; Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 683 , 12 S.Ct. 495) Congress authorized the President, when Congress was not in session, and for a prescribed period ‘whenever, in his opinion, the public safety shall so require, to lay an embargo on all ships and vessels in the ports or the United States, or upon the ships and vessels of the United States, or the ships and vessels of any foreign nation, under such regulations as the circumstances of the case may require, and to continue or revoke the same, whenever he shall think proper.’ By an act of 1799, February 9 (1 Stat. 613, 615, 4), suspending commercial intercourse with France and its dependencies, ‘it shall be lawful for the President of the United States, if he shall deem it expedient and consistent with the interest of the United States, by his order, to remit, and discontinue, for the time being, the restraints and prohibitions aforesaid; … and also to revoke such order (i.e., ree stablish the restraints), whenever, in his opinion, the interest of the United States shall require.’ By an act of October 1, 1890 (26 Stat. 567, 612), sustained in Field v. Clark, supra, the President was authorized to suspend by proclamation the free introduction into this country of enumerated articles when satisfied that a country producing them imposes duties or other exactions upon the agricultural or other products of the United States which he may deem to be reciprocally unequal or unreasonable. By an act of September 21, 1922 (42 Stat. 858, 941, 945 (19 USCA 154- 159, 182 et seq.)), sustained in Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, supra, the President was empowered to increase or decrease tariff duties so as to equalize the differences between the costs of production at home and abroad, and empowered, by the same means, to give redress for other acts of discrimination or unfairness ‘when he finds that the public interest will be [293 U.S. 388, 443]   served thereby.’ 19 USCA 182. Delegation was not confined to an inquiry into the necessity or occasion for the change. It included the magnitude of the change, the delegate thus defining the act to be performed. By an act of June 4, 1897 (30 Stat. 11, 35), amended in 1905 (33 Stat. 628), regulating the forest reservations of the nation, the purpose of the reservations was declared to be ‘to improve and protect the forest within the reservation,’ and to secure ‘favorable conditions of water flows, and to furnish a continuous supply of timber for the use and necessities of citizens of the United States.’ Without further guide or standard, the Secretary of Agriculture was empowered to ‘make such rules and regulations and establish such service as will insure the objects of such reservations, namely, to regulate their occupancy and use and to preserve the forests thereon from destruction.’ The validity of these provisions was upheld in United States v. Grimaud, supra, as against the claim by one who violated the rules that there had been an unlawful delegation. Many other precedents are cited in the margin. They teach one lesson and a clear one.

There is no fear that the nation will drift from its ancient moorings as the result of the narrow delegation of power permitted by this section. What can be done under cover of that permission is closely and clearly circumscribed both as to subject-matter and occasion. The statute was framed in the shadow of a national disaster. A host of unforeseen contingencies would have to be faced from day to day, and faced with a fullness of under [293 U.S. 388, 444]   standing unattainable by any one except the man upon the scene. The President was chosen to meet the instant need.

A subsidiary question remains as to the form of the executive order, which is copied in the margin. The question is a subsidiary one, for, unless the statute is invalid, another order with fuller findings or recitals may correct the informalities of this one, if informalities there are. But the order to my thinking is valid as it stands. The President was not required either by the Constitution or by any statute to state the reasons that had induced him to exercise the granted power. It is enough that the grant of power had been made and that pursuant to that grant he had signified the will to act. The will to act being declared, the law presumes that the declaration was preceded by due inquiry and that it was rooted in sufficient grounds. Such, for a hundred years and more, has been the doctrine of this court. The act of February 28, 1795 (1 Stat. 424), authorized the President ‘whenever the United States shall be invaded, or be in imminent danger of invasion from any foreign nation or Indian tribe,’ to call forth such number of the militia of the states as he shall deem necessary and to issue his [293 U.S. 388, 445]   orders to the appropriate officers for that purpose. Cf. Const. art. 1, 8, cl. 15. When war threatened in the summer of 1812, President Madison, acting under the authority of that statute, directed Major General Dearborn to requisition from New York, Massachusetts, and Connecticut certain numbers of the states’ militia. American State Papers, Military Affairs, vol. 1, pp. 322-325. No finding of ‘imminent danger of invasion’ was made by the President in any express way, nor was such a finding made by the Secretary of War or any other official. The form of the requisitions to Massachusetts and Connecticut appears in the state papers of the government (American State Papers, supra); the form of those to New York was almost certainly the same. Replevin was brought by a New York militia man who refused to obey the orders, and whose property had been taken in payment of a fine imposed by a court martial. The defendant, a deputy marshal, defended on the ground that the orders were valid, and the plaintiff demurred because there was no allegation that the President had adjudged that there was imminent danger of an invasion. The case came to this court. Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. 19, 32. In an opinion by Story, J., the court upheld the seizure. ‘The argument is (he wrote) that the power confided to the president is a limited power, and can be exercised only in the cases pointed out in the statute, and therefore, it is necessary to aver the facts which bring the exercise within the purview of the statute. In short, the same principles are sought t be applied to the delegation and exercise of this power intrusted to the executive of the nation for great political purposes, as might be applied to the humblest officer in the government, acting upon the most narrow and special authority. It is the opinion of the court, that this objection cannot be maintained. When the president exercises an authority confided to him by law, the presumption is, that it is exercised in pursuance [293 U.S. 388, 446]  of law. Every public officer is presumed to act in obedience to his duty, until the contrary is shown; and, a fortiori, this presumption ought to be favor ably applied to the chief magistrate of the Union. It is not necessary to aver, that the act which he might rightfully do, was so done.’ A like presumption has been applied in other cases and in a great variety of circumstances. Philadelphia & Trenton R. Co. v. Stimpson, 14 Pet. 448, 458; Rankin v. Hoyt, 4 How. 327, 335; Carpenter v. Rannels, 19 Wall. 138, 146; Confiscation Cases ( U.S. v. Clarke), 20 Wall. 92, 109; Knox County v. Ninth National Bank, 147 U.S. 91, 97 , 13 S.Ct. 267; United States v. Chemical Foundation, 272 U.S. 1, 14 , 15 S., 47 S.Ct. 1. This does not mean that the individual is helpless in the face of usurpation. A court will not revise the discretion of the Executive, sitting in judgment on his order as if it were the verdict of a jury. Martin v. Mott, supra. On the other hand, we have said that his order may not stand if it is an act of mere oppression, an arbitrary fiat that overleaps the bounds of judgment. Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 399 , 400 S., 401, 53 S.Ct. 190. The complainants and others in their position may show, if they can, that in no conceivable aspect was there anything in the conditions of the oil industry in July, 1933, to establish a connection between the prohibitory order and the declared policies of the Congress. This is merely to say that the standard must be such as to have at least a possible relation to the act to be performed under the delegated power. One can hardly suppose that a prohibitory order would survive a test in court if the Executive were to assert a relation between the transportation of petroleum and the maintenance of the gold standard or the preservation of peace in Europe or the Orient. On the other hand, there can be no challenge of such a mandate unless the possibility of a rational nexus is lacking alto- [293 U.S. 388, 447]   gether. Here, in the case at hand, the relation between the order and the standard is manifest upon the face of the transaction from facts so notorious as to be within the range of our judicial notice. There is significance in the fact that it is not challenged even now.

The President, when acting in the exercise of a delegated power, is not a quasi judicial officer, whose rulings are subject to review upon certiorari or appeal (Chicago Junction Case, 264 U.S. 258, 265 , 44 S.Ct. 317; cf. Givens v. Zerbst, 255 U.S. 11, 20 , 41 S.Ct. 227), or an administrative agency supervised in the same way. Officers and bodies such as those may be required by reviewing courts to express their decision in formal and explicit findings to the end that review may be intelligent. Florida v. United States, 282 U.S. 194, 215 , 51 S.Ct. 119; Beaumont, Sour Lake & Western R. Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 74, 86 , 51 S.Ct. 1; United States v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 293 U.S. 454 , 55 S.Ct. 268, Jan. 7, 1935. Cf. Public Service Commission of Wisconsin v. Wisconsin Telephone Co ., 289 U.S. 67 , 53 S.Ct. 514. Such is not the position or duty of the President. He is the Chief Executive of the nation, exercising a power committed to him by Congress, and subject, in respect of the formal qualities of his acts, to the restrictions, if any, accompanying the grant, but not to any others. One will not find such restrictions either in the statute itself or in the Constitution back of it. The Constitution of the United States is not a code of civil practice.

The prevailing opinion cites Wichita Railroad & Light Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of Kansas, 260 U.S. 48 , 43 S.Ct. 51, and Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 44 , 44 S.Ct. 283. One dealt with a delegation to a public utilities commission of the power to reduce existing rates if they were found to be unreasonable; the other a delegation to the Secretary of Labor of the power to deport aliens found after notice and a hearing to be undesirable residents. In each it was a [293 U.S. 388, 448]   specific requirement of the statute that the basic fact conditioning action by the administrative agency be stated in a finding and stated there expressly. If legislative power is delegated subject to a condition, it is a requirement of constitutional government that the condition be fulfilled. In default of such fulfillment, there is in truth no delegation, and hence no official action, but only the vain show of it. The analogy is remote between power so conditioned and that in controversy here.

Discretionary action does not become subject to review because the discretion is legislative rather than executive. If the reasons for the prohibition now in controversy had been stated in the order, the jurisdiction of the courts would have been no greater and no less. Investigation resulting in an order directed against a particular person after notice and a hearing is not to be confused with investigation preliminary and incidental to the formulation of a rule. An embargo under the act of 1794 would have been more than a nullity though there had been a failure to recite that what was done was essential to the public safety or to enumerate the reasons leading to that conclusion. If findings are necessary as a preamble to general regulations, the requirement must be looked for elsewhere than in the Constitution of the nation.

There are other questions as to the validity of section 9(c), 15 USCA 709(c), in matters unrelated to the delegation of power to the President, and also questions as to the regulations adopted in behalf of the President by the Secretary of the Interior. They are not considered in the prevailing opinion. However, they have been well reviewed and disposed of in the opinion of Sibley, J., writing for the court below. It is unnecessary at this time to dwell upon them further.

The decree in each case should be affirmed.

Footnotes

Footnote 1 ] The full text of the Executive Order of July 11, 1933, is as follows:

    ‘Executive Order
    ‘Prohibition of Transportation in Interstate and Foreign Commerce of Petroleum and the Products Thereof Unlawfully Produced or Withdrawn from Storage.
    ‘By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Act of Congress entitled ‘An Act To encourage national industrial recovery, to foster fair competition, and to provide for the construction of certain useful public works, and for other purposes,’ approved June 16, 1933 (Public No. 67, 73d Congress), the transportation in interstate and foreign commerce of petroleum and the products thereof produced or withdrawn from storage in excess of the amount permitted to be produced or withdrawn from storage by any State law or valid regulation or order prescribed thereunder, by any board, commission, officer, or other duly authorized agency of a State, is hereby prohibited.
    ‘Franklin D. Roosevelt.
    ‘The White House,
    ‘July 11, 1933.’

Footnote 2 ] The Executive Order of July 14, 1933, is as follows:

    ‘Executive Order
    ‘Prohibition of Transportation in Interstate and Foreign Commerce of Petroleum and the Products Thereof Unlawfully Produced or Withdrawn from Storage.
    ‘By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Act of Congress, entitled ‘An Act To encourage national industrial recovery, to foster fair competition, and to provide for the construction of certain useful public works, and for other purposes,’ approved June 16, 1933 (Public No. 67, 73d Congress), in order to effectuate the intent and purpose of the Congress as expressed in Section 9(c) thereof, and for the purpose of securing the enforcement of my order of July 11, 1933, issued pursuant to said act, I hereby authorize the Secretary of the Interior to exercise all the powers vested in me, for the purpose of enforcing Section 9(c) of said act and said order, including full authority to designate and appoint such agents and to set up such boards and agencies as he may see fit, and to promulgate such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary.
    ‘Franklin D. Roosevelt.
    ‘The White House,
    ‘July 14, 1933.’

Footnote 3 ] The Executive Order of August 19, 1933, is as follows:

    ‘Executive Order
    ‘Code of Fair Competition for the Petroleum Industry.
    ‘An application having been duly made, pursuant to and in full compliance with the provisions of Title I of the National Industrial Recovery Act, approved June 16, 1933, for my approval of a Code of Fair Competition for the Petroleum Industry, and hearings having been held thereon and the Administrator having rendered his report together with his recommendations and findings with respect thereto, and the Administrator having found that the said Code of Fair Competition complies in all respects with the pertinent provisions of Title I of said Act and that the requirements of clauses (1) and (2) of subsection (a) of Section 3 of the said Act have been met:
    ‘Now, Therefore, I, Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States, pursuant to the authority vested in me by Title I of the National Industrial Recovery Act, approved June 16, 1933, and otherwise, do adopt and approve the report, recommendations and findings of the Administrator and do order that the said Code of Fair Competition be and it is hereby approved.
    ‘Franklin D. Roosevelt.
    ‘Approval Recommended:
    ‘Hugh S. Johnson, Administrator.
    ‘The White House,
    ‘August 19, 1933.’

Footnote 4 ] The government states that, although the second paragraph of section 4 of article III was a part of the code for a short period prior to September 13, 1933, no legal basis exists for prosecution for production in Texas during that period.

Footnote 5 ] See United States v. The Schooner Peggy, 1 Cranch, 103, 109, 110; Dinsmore v. Southern Express Co., 183 U.S. 115 ;, 120, 22 S.Ct. 45; Crozier v. Fried Krupp Aktiengesellschaft, 224 U.S. 290, 302 , 32 S.Ct. 488; Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe R. Co. v. Dennis, 224 U.S. 503, 507 , 32 S.Ct. 542; Watts, Watts & Co. v. Unione Austriaca, 248 U.S. 9, 21 , 39 S.Ct. 1, 3 A.L.R. 323; Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 464 , 41 S.Ct. 172, 16 A.L.R. 196; American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Council, 257 U.S. 184, 201 , 42 S.Ct. 72, 27 A.L.R. 360; Texas Company v. Brown, 258 U.S. 466, 474 , 42 S.Ct. 375.

Footnote 6 ] The text of section 1 is as follows:

    ‘Section 1. A national emergency productive of widespread unemployment and disorganization of industry, which burdens interstate and foreign commerce, affects the public welfare, and undermines the standards of living of the American people, is hereby declared to exist. It is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress to remove obstructions to the free flow of interstate and foreign commerce which tend to diminish the amount thereof; and to provide for the general welfare by promoting the organization of industry for the purpose of cooperative action among trade groups, to induce and maintain united action of labor and management under adequate governmental sanctions and supervision, to eliminate unfair competitive practices, to promote the fullest possible utilization of the present productive capacity of industries, to avoid undue restriction of production (except as may be temporarily required), to increase the consumption of industrial and agricultural products by increasing purchasing power, to reduce and relieve unemployment, to improve standards of labor, and otherwise to rehabilitate industry and to conserve natural resources.’

Footnote 7 ] Acts of June 4, 1794, 1 Stat. 372; March 3, 1795, 1 Stat. 444; June 13, 1798, 1 Stat. 565, 566; February 9, 1799, 1 Stat. 613, 615; February 27, 1800, 2 Stat. 7, 9, 10; March 3, 1805, 2 Stat. 339, 341, 342; February 28, 1806, 2 Stat. 351, 352; April 22, 1808, 2 Stat. 490.

Footnote 8 ] Marshall’s Life of Washington, vol. 2, p. 319 et seq.

Footnote 9 ] Thus, prior to the Act of June 4, 1794 (1 Stat. 372), the Congress had laid embargoes, for limited periods, upon vessels in ports of the United States bound to foreign ports. Resolutions of March 26, 1794, and April 18, 1794, 1 Stat. 400, 401. Fearing that the national safety might be endangered, the President, by the Act of June 4, 1794, was authorized to lay an embargo, with appropriate regulations, whenever he found that ‘the public safety shall so require’ (section 1), the authority not to be exercised while the Congress was in session and the embargo to be limited in any case to 15 days after the commencement of the next session. The Act of March 3, 1795 (1 Stat. 444), authorizing the President to permit the exportation of arms, etc., was ‘in cases connected with the security of the commercial interest of the United States, and for public purposes only.’ By the Act of June 13, 1798 (1 Stat. 565), commercial intercourse was suspended between the United States and France and its dependencies. The act was to continue only until the end of the next session of Congress, and it was provided (section 5) that if, before the next session, the government of France ‘shall clearly disavow, and shall be found to refrain from the aggressions, depredations and hostilities’ against the vessels and other property of citizens of the United States, and shall acknowledge the neutrality of the United States, ‘it shall be lawful for the President,’ ‘being well ascertained of the premises,’ to remit and discontinue the prohibitions and restraints imposed by the act and to make proclamation accordingly. (continued on p. 423)

The Act of February 9, 1799 (1 Stat. 613), further suspended commercial intercourse between the United States and France and its dependencies until March 3, 1800, and gave a similar authority (section 4) to the President to remit and discontinue the restraints and prohibitions of the act, ‘if he shall deem it expedient and consistent with the interest of the United States,’ either with respect to the French Republic or to any place belonging to that republic, ‘with which a commercial intercourse may safely be renewed,’ and to revoke such order if he found that the interest of the United States so required. The suspension of commercial intercourse was renewed by the Act of February 27, 1800 (2 Stat. 7) until March 3, 1801, with a similar provision as to the authority of the President. The Act of March 3, 1805 (2 Stat. 339), related to persons committing treason, felony, etc., within the jurisdiction of the United States and taking refuge in foreign armed vessels, and the authority to the President to permit or prevent the entry of such vessels into the waters of the United States (section 4) was ‘in order to prevent insults to the authority of the laws, whereby the peace of the United States with foreign nations may be endangered.’ See, also, Act of April 22, 1808, 2 Stat. 490. See, also, Proclamations of President Adams, ‘Works of John Adams,’ vol. IX, pp. 176, 177.

Footnote 10 ] See Act of June 28, 1809, 2 Stat. 550.

Footnote 11 ] Acts of March 3, 1815, 3 Stat. 224; March 3, 1817, 3 Stat. 361; January 7, 1824, 4 Stat. 2; May 24, 1828, 4 Stat. 308; May 31, 1830, 4 Stat. 425; March 6, 1866, 14 Stat. 3; March 3, 1883, 22 Stat. 490; June 26, 1884, 23 Stat. 57; October 1, 1890, 26 Stat. 616; R.S. 2493, 2494, 4219, 4228. Proclamations of Presidents: 3 Stat.App. 1; 4 Stat.App. 3, pp. 814- 818; 9 Stat.App. 1001, 1004; 11 Stat.App. 795; 13 Stat.App. 739; 14 Stat. App. 818, 819; 16 Stat.App. 1127; 17 Stat.App. 954, 956, 957; 21 Stat. 800; 23 Stat. 841, 842, 844.

For other analogous statutes, see Acts of December 17, 1813, 3 Stat. 88, 93; June 19, 1886, 24 Stat. 79, 82 (section 17 (46 USCA 142)); March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 475 (46 USCA 143); August 30, 1890, 26 Stat. 414, 415 ( sections 4, 5 (21 USCA 18; 19 USCA 181)); February 15, 1893, 27 Stat. 449, 452 (section 7 (42 USCA 111)); March 2, 1895, 28 Stat. 727, 733; September 8, 1916, 39 Stat. 756, 799 (15 USCA 75-77); June 15, 1917, 40 Stat. 217, 225; August 10, 1917, 40 Stat. 276; October 6, 1917, 40 Stat. 411, 422 (section 11 (50 USCA Appendix, 11)); March 4, 1919, 40 Stat. 1348, 1350; June 17, 1930, 46 Stat. 590, 704 (section 338 (19 USCA 1338 )). Resolutions of March 14, 1912, 37 Stat. 630; January 31, 1922, 42 Stat. 361 (22 USCA 236, 237). Proclamations: 24 Stat. 1024, 1025, 1028, 1030; 27 Stat. 995, 1011; 38 Stat. 1960; 39 Stat. 1756; 40 Stat. 1683, 1689, et seq.

Footnote 12 ] See, also, sections 4(b) and 5(a) of the Trading with the Enemy Act, 40 Stat. 411, 414, 415, 50 USCA Appendix 4(b), 5(a).

Footnote 13 ] Act of March 28, 1928, 5 (amending section 9 of the Radio Act of 1927) 45 Stat. 373.

Footnote 14 ] See Acts and Proclamations cited in note 11, supra.

Footnote 15 ] See Philadelphia & T.R.R. Co. v. Stimpson, 14 Pet. 448, 458; Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. 19, 30, 32; Dakota Central Telephone Co. v. South Dakota, 250 U.S. 163, 182 , 184 S., 39 S.Ct. 507, 4 A.L.R. 1623; United States v. Chemical Foundation, 272 U.S. 1, 14 , 15 S., 47 S.Ct. 1; Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 399 , 53 S.Ct. 190.

Footnote 1 ] ‘Section 1. … It is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress to remove obstructions to the free flow of interstate and foreign commerce which tend to diminish the amount thereof; and to provide for the general welfare by promoting the organization of industry for the purpose of cooperative action among trade groups, to induce and maintain united action of labor and management under adequate governmental sanctions and supervision, to eliminate unfair competitive practices, to promote the fullest possible utilization of the present productive capacity of industries, to avoid undue restriction of production (except as may be temporarily required), to increase the consumption of industrial and agricultural products by increasing purchasing power, to reduce and relieve unemployment, to improve standards of labor, and otherwise to rehabilitate industry and to conserve natural resources.’

The act as a whole is entitled as one ‘To encourage national industrial recovery, to foster fair competition, and to provide for the construction of certain useful public works, and for other purposes,’ and the heading of title I, which includes sections 1 to 10, is ‘Industrial Recovery.’

Footnote 2 ] 2 Stat. 411, December 19, 1806; 3 Stat. 224, March 3, 1815; 23 Stat. 31, 32, May 29, 1884; 25 Stat. 659, February 9, 1889; 38 Stat. 717 (15 USCA 41 et seq.), September 26, 1914; 41 Stat. 593 (8 USCA 157), May 10, 1920; Williams v. United States, 138 U.S. 514 , 11 S.Ct. 457; Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470 , 24 S.Ct. 349; Inter-Mountain Rate Case (U.S. v. Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co.), 234 U.S. 476 , 34 S.Ct. 986; Mahler v. Eby,264 U.S. 32 , 44 S.Ct. 283. Cf. Emergency Banking Act of March 9, 1933, 48 Stat. 1; Agricultural Adjustment Act of May 12, 1933, 48 Stat. 51, 53, 43.

Footnote 3 ] ‘Executive Order. Prohibition of Transportation in Interstate and Foreign Commerce of Petroleum and the Products Thereof Unlawfully Produced or Withdrawn from Storage. By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Act of Congress entitled ‘An Act To encourage national industrial recovery, to foster fair competition, and to provide for the construction of certain useful public works, and for other purposes,’ approved June 16, 1933 ( Public No. 67, 73d Congress), the transportation in interstate and foreign commerce of petroleum and the products thereof produced or withdrawn from storage in excess of the amount permitted to be produced or withdrawn from storage by any State law or valid regulation or order prescribed thereunder, by any board, commission, officer, or other duly authorized agency of a State, is hereby prohibited. Franklin D. Roosevelt. The White House, July 11, 1933.’ No. 6199.

Merchant Marine Act of 1920 (the Jones Act)

(Source: “Merchant Marine Act of 1920,” Wikipedia, 5 November 2013. Sources indicated the act was adopted in early June 1920. The post date assigned to this document is 1 June 1920.)

Merchant Marine Act of 1920

The Merchant Marine Act of 1920 (P.L. 66-261), also known as the Jones Act, is a United States federal statute that regulates maritime commerce in U.S. waters and between U.S. ports. Section 27 is part of the Jones Act that deals with cabotage (i.e., coastal shipping) and requires that all goods transported by water between U.S. ports be carried in U.S.-flag ships, constructed in the United States, owned by U.S. citizens, and crewed by U.S. citizens and U.S. permanent residents. The Act was introduced by Senator Wesley Jones.

In addition, amendments to the Jones Act, known as the Cargo Preference Act (P.L. 83-644), provide permanent legislation for the transportation of waterborne cargoes in U.S.-flag vessels. The Merchant Marine Act of 1920 has been revised a number of times, the most recent revision was the recodified version of 2006.[1]

The Jones Act is often confused with the Death on the High Seas Act, another United States maritime law that does not apply to coastal and in-land navigable waters.

Objectives and Purpose of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920

TITLE 46, APPENDIX App. > CHAPTER 24 > 861. Purpose and policy of United States[2] It is necessary for the national defense and for the proper growth of its foreign and domestic commerce that the United States shall have a merchant marine of the best equipped and most suitable types of vessels sufficient to carry the greater portion of its commerce and serve as a naval or military auxiliary in time of war or national emergency, ultimately to be owned and operated privately by citizens of the United States; and it is declared to be the policy of the United States to do whatever may be necessary to develop and encourage the maintenance of such a merchant marine, and, insofar as may not be inconsistent with the express provisions of this Act, the Secretary of Transportation shall, in the disposition of vessels and shipping property as hereinafter provided, in the making of rules and regulations, and in the administration of the shipping laws keep always in view this purpose and object as the primary end to be attained.

Cabotage

Cabotage is the transport of goods or passengers between two points in the same country by a vessel or an aircraft registered in another country. Originally a shipping term, cabotage now also covers aviation, railways, and road transport. Cabotage is “trade or navigation in coastal waters, or, the exclusive right of a country to operate the air traffic within its territory”. Cabotage is used in the context of “cabotage rights”, the right of a company from one country to trade in another country. In aviation terms, it is the right to operate within the domestic borders of another country. Most countries enact cabotage laws for reasons of economic protectionism, national security or public safety.The cabotage provisions relating to the “Jones Act” restrict the carriage of goods or passengers between United States ports to U.S.-built and flagged vessels. It has been codified as portions of 46 U.S.C.  Generally, the Jones Act prohibits any foreign built or foreign flagged vessel from engaging in coastwise trade within the United States. A number of other statutes affect coastwise trade and should be consulted along with the Jones Act. These include the Passenger Services Act, 46 USC section 289 which restricts coastwise transportation of passengers and 46 USC section 12108 restricts the use of foreign vessel to commercially catch or transport fish in U.S. waters.[3]These provisions also require at least three-fourths of the crewmembers to be U.S. citizens. Moreover, the steel of foreign repair work on the hull and superstructure of a U.S.-flagged vessel is limited to ten percent by weight. This part of the policy is required for national security to maintain a shipbuilding capacity for construction and repair of vessels within the United States.

Seamen’s rights

The U.S. Congress adopted the Merchant Marine Act in early June 1920, formerly46 U.S.C. § 688 and codified on October 6, 2006 as 46 U.S.C. § 30104. The Act formalized the rights of seamen.

It allows injured sailors to make claims and collect from their employers for the negligence of the ship owner, the captain, or fellow members of the crew.[4] It operates simply by extending similar legislation already in place that allowed for recoveries by railroad workers and providing that this legislation also applies to sailors. Its operative provision is found at 46 U.S.C. § 688(a), which provides:

“Any sailor who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with the right to trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States modifying or extending the common-law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway employees shall apply…”

This allows seamen to bring actions against ship owners based on claims of unseaworthiness or negligence. These are rights not afforded by common international maritime law.

The United States Supreme Court, in the case of Chandris, Inc., v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 115 S.Ct. 2172 (1995), has set a benchmark for determining the status of any employee as a “Jones Act” seaman. Any worker who spends less than 30 percent of his time in the service of a vessel on navigable waters is presumed not to be a seaman under the Jones Act. An action under the Act may be brought either in a U.S. federal court or in a state court. The seaman/plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial, a right which is not afforded in maritime law absent a statute authorizing it.

Criticism

Critics note that the legislation results in costs for moving cargo between U.S. ports that are far higher than if such restrictions did not apply[citation needed]. In essence, they argue, the act is protectionism.

Critics also contend the Jones Act has caused the U.S. shipbuilding industry to build vessels in the U.S. which are more expensive than those built elsewhere. A 2001 U.S. Department of Commerce study indicates that U.S. shipyards build only one percent of the world’s large commercial ships. Few ships are ordered from U.S. shipyards except for cabotage. U.S. operators of ships in cabotage have an economic incentive to continue operating old vessels rather than replace them with relatively high cost vessels built in the U.S. The report concluded that the lack of United States competitiveness stemmed from foreign subsidies, unfair trade practices, and lack of U.S. productivity.[citation needed] However, the same argument buttresses that of their opponents who state that without the Jones Act, all remaining US shipyards would be deconstructed or outsourced overseas resulting in the utter destruction of the US Maritime industry. In turn, this would result in higher costs for US Navy vessels and eventually require most Naval ships meant for national defense to be built overseas as well.[5][dead link]

Moreover, critics point to the lack of a U.S.-flagged international shipping fleet. They claim that it is economically impossible for U.S.-flagged, -built, and -crewed ships to compete internationally with vessels built and registered in other nations with crews willing to work for wages that are a fraction of what their U.S. counterparts earn.[citation needed] However, the same argument is used by the Seamen Union which claims the Jones Act allows for a well paid, educated, and all American merchant mariner force.[citation needed]

Support

Supporters of the Shipping Act maintain that the legislation is of strategic economic and wartime interest to the United States. The act, they say, protects the nation’s sealift capability and its ability to produce commercial ships. In addition, the act is seen as a vital factor in helping maintain a viable workforce of trained merchant mariners for commerce and national emergencies. During the Vietnam War, ships crewed by civilian seamen carried 95% of the supplies used by the American armed forces. Many of these ships sailed into combat zones under fire. The SS Mayaguez incident involved the capture of mariners from the American merchant ship SS Mayaguez.[6] Supporters say that it also protects seafarers from deplorable living and working conditions often found on foreign-flagged ships. Finally, they point to the key role played by the US Merchant Marine in supporting Global operations against terrorism and the Iraq and Afghanistan Campaigns. They claim that without these assets, the US would be under substantial foreign influence in conducting its policy in accordance with National Security.[5][dead link]

America needs a strong and vibrant U.S.-Flag Merchant Marine. That is why you can continue to count on me to support the Jones Act (which also includes the Passenger Vessel Services Act) and the continued exclusion of maritime services in international trade agreements. Barack Obama, August 28, 2008 [7][dead link]

I can assure you that a Reagan Administration will not support legislation that would jeopardize this long-standing policy … embodied in the Jones Act … or the jobs dependent on it. President Ronald Reagan, 1980 [8]

“The [Jones Act trailership] SS NORTHERN LIGHTS made 25 voyages and 49 port calls [to the Iraqi war zone]. She carried 12,200 pieces of military gear totaling 81,000 short tons and covering over 2,000,000 square feet (190,000 m2). Those statistics clearly demonstrate the value that the U.S.-flag shipping industry brings to the Defense Transportation System. General Norton A. Schwartz, USAF, Commander in Chief, U.S. Transportation Command, 2005 [8]

When it comes to backing the Jones Act, from my standpoint, it’s a no-brainer. We need a strong maritime industry, and part of a strong industry is highly trained merchant mariners, so many of whom are employed on Jones Act ships. We need a strong shipbuilding industry. We can’t let the generations that follow us forget what America was capable of when the call went out for Liberty and Victory ships during World War II. We need the current shipping capacity to move the lifeblood of this country where it needs to go, when it needs to go. The Jones Act supports all these things. It’s vital to our national security. Rear Admiral Mark Buzby, Commander, U.S. Military Sealift Command, 2012 [8]

The Jones Act has been supported by Presidents Obama, Clinton, Bush, Reagan, Carter, and Ford, and further all the way back to Woodrow Wilson who originally signed it into law in 1920. It is supported by American military leaders. Furthermore, there are other domestic interests which support the Act both from self-interest in keeping them cost competitive in some areas in contrast to the high-cost of sea traffic as well as more altruistic policies of keeping a diversified transportation system. In fact, all of these transportation interests intersect seafaring cargo at some point in the supply line. Consequently, retention of the Jones Act is also supported from the domestic airline, trucking, and rail industries. “Reduced to its essential terms, the Jones Act simply requires companies operating in the domestic commerce of the United States to comply with U.S. laws. This requirement includes corporate taxes, the National Labor Relations Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, Coast Guard standards, employing American citizens, etc. American ships are subject to these laws and foreign ships are not. This same fundamental principle applies to every other company doing business in the United States, from agriculture to retail.” (Quote from R.J. Pfeiffer, maritime expert former CEO of Alexander Baldwin in commentary published in the Star Advertiser 12/26/1997)

Waivers of Shipping Act provisions

Requests for waivers of certain provisions of the act are reviewed by the United States Maritime Administration on a case-by-case basis. Waivers have been granted in cases of national emergencies or in cases of strategic interest.[9]

In the wake of Hurricane KatrinaHomeland Security Secretary Michael Chertofftemporarily waived the U.S. Shipping Act for foreign vessels carrying oil and natural gas from September 1 to 19, 2005.[10][11]

In order to conduct an emergency shipment of gasoline from Dutch Harbor, Alaskato Nome in January 2012, Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitanogranted a waiver to the Russian ice class marine tanker RendaRenda was originally scheduled to onload gasoline in Northern Japan for shipment but was unable due to a gale.[12]

The Department of Homeland Security issued a blanket waiver of the Jones Act to all shipping for 12 days from November 2 to 13 2012, following widespread fuel shortages caused by Hurricane Sandy.[13][14]

See also

References

  1. ^ http://www.1800jonesact.com/Jones-Act/
  2. ^ Title 46a of the US Code as currently published by the US Government reflects the laws passed by Congress as of Jan. 3, 2012, and it is this version that is published here.http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode46a/usc_sec_46a_00000861—-000-.html
  3. ^http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode46/usc_sup_01_46_06_V_08_D_10_551.htmlch.551 Coastwise Trade.
  4. ^ jones act
  5. a b “Maritime law tough to navigate,” Portland Press Herald/Maine Sunday Telegram. October 3, 2006.
  6. ^ Bush, George W. (May 21, 2002). “National Maritime Day, 2002”. Whitehouse.gov. Retrieved 2008-11-22.
  7. ^ “Obama Reaches Out to SIU and Michael Sacco in a Letter After SIU Endorsement”
  8. a b c http://www.americanmaritimepartnership.com/statements.html
  9. ^ “Coast wise: the U.S. marine Jeff Ownz is keeping a close watch on Maritime Act assaults,” Workboat. January 1, 2007
  10. ^ “DHS: Update: United States Government Response to the Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina”. Dhs.gov. September 15, 2005. Retrieved July 6, 2010.
  11. ^ http://npga.org/files/public/Jones_Act_Waver_9-05.pdf
  12. ^ [1]
  13. ^ U.S. Gulf Gasoline Increases After Jones Act Is Suspended Bloomberg, Nov 2, 2012
  14. ^ US issues blanket Jones Act waiver for fuel tankers after Sandy Reuters, Nov 2, 2012

Further reading

  • Sethi, ArjunThe Merchant Marine Act of 1920: The Impact on American Labor (2005).

 

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